Michael Walzer: From Just War to Politics Gone Awry

Published in January 2026 in Haaretz, the text we are publishing—based on a three-hour interview with the American philosopher Michael Walzer during a visit to Israel—is of exceptional value. It presents itself both as an overview of what has transpired since October 7 by this leading specialist in the ethics of war, and as a biographical self-reflection in which the main threads of his thought and his existential choices—his “outsider” Zionism, or, if viewed from the opposite angle, his left-wing American diasporism committed to Israel’s side—intersect and shed light on one another. For the Jewish and European perspective of K., his position constitutes an important point of reference. All the more so as developments in the situation lead him to an assessment of Israel that, beyond differences in perception stemming from the gap between the two diasporic roots and the specific perspectives arising from them, converges with the one we have come to formulate over the months.

Ten days after October 7, the author of Just and Unjust Wars (1977) gave an interview that we had then reprinted— “Justice demands the defeat of Hamas, not vengeance against the Palestinians”—because it seemed to us to describe most accurately the terms of the war that was beginning at that moment, and the dilemmas it posed. While describing the Hamas attack as an “old-fashioned pogrom,” and emphasizing what was justifiable about the war’s outbreak, the author hoped that Israelis would not fall into the cruel trap set for them—“a new war in the fullest and most intensified sense”—with the heavy civilian casualties on the Palestinian side that would result. A democracy like Israel had a duty to avoid such casualties as much as possible, even in a context where Hamas’s strategy relentlessly used the civilian population as human shields. Deeply concerned by the decision to “launch a total siege of Gaza and perhaps set out to conquer it,” he called for this war to remain a “limited war,” given that its legitimacy depended on its being restricted to a specific goal: the neutralization of the threat that Hamas objectively posed to Israel, whose murderous nature and exterminationist zeal were visible to all.

Yet this is not what happened. And this observation cannot fail to have consequences for the new assessment that must now be made, in a situation whose complexity has been renewed by the conflict that began on February 28, with the war launched by Israel and the United States against Iran. That this sequence, for Israel—which does not mean the same applies to the United States—cannot be separated from the one initiated on October 7, and that we are therefore still in the aftermath of the historic turning point it represented, should be self-evident. But this obviousness still needs to be made explicit and interpreted in terms of what it truly means.

The initial legitimacy of the war waged in Gaza did not mean that Israel remained within its rights, neither on that territory nor in its increasingly repressive and colonizing policy in the West Bank. From a threshold that Walzer clearly defines, the just war became unjust the moment a political—rather than military—path emerged to defeat Hamas and free the hostages, and that path was rejected by the Israeli government.

In Europe, it is striking that this is by no means a given. Regarding the current war, the prevailing view is a simplistic one of two opposing blocs, one of which is driven solely by imperialist aims—American-Israeli, without distinction—while the other, however reprehensible its domestic policies may be, has found itself at war against its will. Walzer’s account of October 7 sets the record straight. He aptly reminds us of what we here have been too quick to forget: Iran’s involvement in the entire sequence of events, an involvement whose significance extends right up to the present day. Walzer’s interview took place a few weeks before the start of a conflict he obviously could not have predicted. Nevertheless, what he states allows for a better understanding of the present, through the threads he brings to light in what has since unfolded.

By late 2023, the Israeli response in Gaza was fully justified as a defensive war in a conflict in which Iran was already a party.

Israel’s good fortune was that the three fronts—in Gaza, Lebanon, and with Iran—did not open simultaneously through a three-pronged attack, which would have threatened its very existence. To that extent, the twelve-day war of June 2025 was just as justified as the outbreak of the one in Gaza. And the unity currently prevailing in Israel in support of the offensive is a still-perceptible echo of that. No one forgets that Iran gave the green light on October 7, and that its actions continued through its many proxies, including, of course, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. In doing so, it was merely carrying out its desire to destroy the “Zionist entity,” a fundamental and unwavering pillar of its foreign policy. Under these circumstances, doing everything possible to prevent it from achieving its goals was and remains a priority. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether the military objective of eliminating the primary source of this threat—the full extent of which was revealed on October 7—can realistically be pursued. In short, the same dilemma that was previously faced is now repeating itself, albeit on a different scale and along a different front.

It is this dilemma—and the disastrous consequences to which its previous occurrence led—that weigh on the interpretation of the current conflict. Indeed, the initial legitimacy of the war waged in Gaza did not mean that Israel remained within its rights, neither on that territory nor in its increasingly repressive and colonizing policy in the West Bank. From a threshold that Walzer clearly defines, the just war became unjust the moment a political—rather than military—path emerged to defeat Hamas and free the hostages—which had indeed occurred thanks to Joe Biden’s intervention—and was rejected by the Israeli government.

There is therefore no doubt as to the government’s guilt, just as there is no doubt regarding the reactionary and vengeful frenzy of a significant portion of Israeli society, which the army has unfortunately echoed. The philosopher’s assessment is unrelenting: the jus in bello, the law of war—distinct from the right to wage war—has been violated by Israel in multiple ways, through acts of extreme gravity. And at the same time, the violence in the West Bank against Palestinians, perpetrated by settlers protected by the army, has taken the form of what must be called pogroms. For if the term were to be applied to October 7 due to its modus operandi and its purpose, this application is no less justified for outbursts of violence whose murderous intentions are perfectly explicit. On this domestic front, the situation is worsening day by day, with only a few sporadic mobilizations by peace movements striving to intervene.

Added to this, within Israel itself, are the repeated legislative attacks which, like the current bill on the death penalty, aim solely to open discriminatory loopholes in the rule of law through which extremism will have nothing left to do but rush in. Once again, we are forced to rely on the Supreme Court—which, as we know, faces intense hostility from the current leadership—as the last line of defense.

In short, the portrait Walzer paints of Israeli politics—without wavering from his defense of a state for the Jewish people in a context where dangers persist—is overwhelming. And it is this sense of despair that we share at this moment, reduced as we are to placing all our hopes in the possibilities that might still emerge from a complete change of course. Michael Walzer’s lucidity—far removed from the simplistic approach that crushes the plurality of factors that must be taken into account, but also from the avoidance of unambiguously naming the reality that imposes itself upon our gaze—is thus a most precious source of support for us. By reminding us of the long trajectory of political reflection and commitment against the violence of war, but also for Israel, from which his analyses stem, he enables us to better gauge the depth of our concerns and the stance we must take in a context that, however rife with contradictions it may be, must not condemn us to silence and inaction.