In a nation still reckoning with the shadows of its past, Germany’s response to antisemitism today is layered with complexity and urgency. Recent measures, from appointing antisemitism commissioners to intensifying security for Jewish communities, aim to confront a troubling rise in antisemitic incidents—yet they also expose the delicate tension between genuine protection and political maneuvering. Part two of Monty Ott’s report, presented in partnership with DILCRAH, dives into Germany’s fraught battle against antisemitism, revealing not only the strides taken but also the ethical and societal questions that linger unanswered.
Measures
In the federal government’s 2021 coalition agreement, the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany), Alliance 90/The Greens and FDP (“Free Democratic Party” – liberal party) explicitly referred to the fight against antisemitism at the following points and agreed to do so:
“We strengthen initiatives that promote Jewish life in its diversity and combat all forms of antisemitism, as decided by the Bundestag with reference to the definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). Together with the federal states, we will ensure the protection of Jews and their institutions. It is a shameful and painful state of affairs that they have to be permanently guarded in Germany. We are committed to prevention, awareness-raising education and training as well as more determined prosecution and documentation of antisemitic incidents. We will strengthen the structure of the antisemitism commissioner”
and “Israel’s security is a matter of state for us […]. We will take a strong stand against attempts to condemn Israel on antisemitic grounds, including in the United Nations.”[1] This is remarkable insofar as the upgrading of the fight against antisemitism to an “institutionalized[…] object of state action” only began after the turn of the millennium.[2] Although the “confrontations in the parliamentary, legal and media context” that then began were primarily “selective”, they represent a success of the struggles of “Jewish and non-Jewish institutions and civil society actors”.[3]
NS-Relativierung bei Corona-Demo in Berlin – Rund 1000 Menschen demonstrierten unter dem Motto #EsReicht gegen die Corona-Maßnahmen der Regierung. Einige Teilnehmende relativierten den Nationalsozialismus und die Shoah.
Video & Fotos: https://t.co/HSwVpjC7KA #b1303 #Antisemitsmus pic.twitter.com/IIGLQvARtr— democ (@democ_de) March 13, 2021
Tweet reads: Nazi-Relativization at the Corona protest in Berlin – Around 1,000 people demonstrated under the slogan #Enough against the government’s coronavirus measures. Some participants relativized National Socialism and the Shoah.
The following is an incomplete overview of measures taken by the state to curb antisemitism. A distinction is made between measures implemented before and after October 7, 2023.
Before October 7
Establishment of antisemitism commissioners
One of the most far-reaching political decisions to date has probably been the successive establishment of antisemitism commissioners at both federal and state level. This development began on January 18, 2018 with the establishment of the Federal Government Commissioner for Jewish Life in Germany and the Fight against Antisemitism. This was directly related to “the intensive discussion about an increase in antisemitism in Germany and the question of how this phenomenon can best be countered at the federal level.”[4] On May 1, 2018, Felix Klein was appointed to this position with the support of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, who had been working as a special representative for relations with Jewish organizations and antisemitism issues at the Federal Foreign Office since 2014. His remit is to “coordinate measures by the Federal Government to combat antisemitism across all ministries” and to “act as a point of contact for Jewish groups and social organizations as well as a mediator for the fight against antisemitism by the Federal Government, the federal states and civil society”. It is also tasked with “raising society’s awareness of current and historical forms of antisemitism through public relations work and political and cultural education”.[5] This mandate is based on an inter-party resolution passed by the Bundestag in January 2018.[6]
On his website, the Commissioner lists a handful of measures that he has implemented since his appointment six years ago. These include the establishment of the “permanent federal-state commission” (September 2019) to coordinate federal and state measures; the establishment of an advisory group made up of Jewish and non-Jewish experts (September 2019); the promotion of monitoring of antisemitic incidents below the threshold of criminal liability; the promotion of cooperation between civil society and security authorities; long-term research funding on antisemitism.
One of the most far-reaching political decisions to date has probably been the successive establishment of antisemitism commissioners at both federal and state level.
In addition, the Commissioner has developed the “National Strategy against Antisemitism and for Jewish Life” (NASAS) in intensive exchange with Jewish organizations, which was introduced and adopted by the Federal Minister of the Interior Nancy Faeser (SPD) on November 30, 2022. This is intended to “combine research, prevention and combating antisemitism as well as the promotion of Jewish life as a cross-cutting task across policy areas and levels in a holistic approach”.[7] To this end, five central fields of action were identified (data collection, research and situational awareness; education as antisemitism prevention; culture of remembrance, historical awareness and commemoration; repressive combating of antisemitism and security; Jewish present and history) into which “mandates for action” from three “cross-sectional dimensions” flow (perspective of those affected, structural education, digitality).[8] The strategy aims to address antisemitism as a problem for society as a whole.
Almost all federal states have now also set up full-time or voluntary positions for antisemitism officers at state level. In Bremen, both the Jewish community[9] and Mayor Andreas Bovenschulte (SPD) refrained from setting up an independent commissioner. In Bremen, this task is carried out by a head of department in the Senate Chancellery. The city of Bamberg[10] and the Berlin district of Lichtenberg[11], for example, have also appointed their own commissioners. The police in Bavaria and Berlin have set up positions for commissioners and police rabbis have been appointed in Baden-Württemberg and Saxony-Anhalt. Public prosecutors’ offices in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia also set up commissioner positions.
BDS resolutions
There were major controversies in the context of state strategies against antisemitism in the context of resolutions on the Israel boycott campaign “Boycott, Divest, Sanctions” (BDS). This development can presumably be traced back to the Green Youth of Bavaria. At its state council in July 2017, it passed a resolution against any cooperation with the BDS campaign, before its motion “No to antisemitism. No to BDS!” was adopted. In this motion, the BDS campaign was described “in its entirety as antisemitic, anti-Israel, reactionary and anti-enlightenment”.[12] The Bavarian Greens thus declared their opposition to “all efforts of the BDS campaign” and wanted to counteract the efforts of the BDS campaign through “educational work”. Any cooperation was to be rejected. All parties (with the exception of the SPD) followed suit and adopted similar motions on BDS or the boycott of Israel.
In May 2019, the German Bundestag also adopted the inter-party motion (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, Alliance 90/The Greens) “Resolutely countering the BDS movement – combating antisemitism”.[13] The initiative for this resolution was launched by Frank Müller-Rosentritt MP and Bijan Djir-Sarai, then foreign policy spokesman for the FDP parliamentary group, with a decision by the parliamentary group. This motion represents a joint expression of will and opinion by the democratic parties represented in the Bundestag, which were also directed against a BDS motion by the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Whether it has legal effect is disputed.[14] Six points were decided in this motion: a condemnation of the BDS campaign, no support from the Bundestag and the federal government, support for the federal antisemitism commissioner, no financial support for organizations “that question Israel’s right to exist” or for projects that support BDS and its goals, as well as a call to federal states, cities and municipalities and all public actors to “join this stance”. A lawsuit was filed against the so-called “BDS resolution”. The plaintiffs argued that their fundamental right to freedom of expression and assembly was being restricted and that they were being labeled “antisemitic” even though they were “merely critical of Israel”. In 2023, the Berlin Higher Administrative Court ruled at second instance that it did not have jurisdiction, as the “substantive review of the decision as such […] is reserved for the Federal Constitutional Court”.[15] The criticism of the decision was primarily linked to its impact on local authorities. The Bundestag had welcomed the fact that “numerous municipalities have already decided to refuse financial support and the allocation of municipal premises to the BDS movement or groups pursuing the objectives of the campaign.” In 2017, for example, Munich and Frankfurt am Main decided to no longer make municipal premises available. Repeated legal action was taken against this and it was not until the Bavarian Administrative Court ruled in November 2020 and the Federal Administrative Court in January 2022 that blanket bans were inadmissible. This would require general laws.
In 2019, four of the five major university student associations, together with the Young Forum of the German-Israeli Society and the Jewish Student Union Germany, adopted the resolution “Against BDS and all antisemitism”. In the resolution, the organizations acknowledge Israel’s right to exist and its security, recognize antisemitism in all its forms as a threat to Jewish life and democracy, call for the establishment of chairs in the field of antisemitism research, condemn the BDS campaign and support the IHRA working definition.[16] Subsequently, the German Rectors’ Conference also passed a similar resolution.
Adoption IHRA
The “Working Definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance” (IHRA working definition of antisemitism), which was also mentioned in the motion, was also the subject of controversial discussion. This was adopted by the German government in September 2017 and thus elevated to the “basis for a common understanding of antisemitism at national level”. Several other civil society and political actors have adopted the IHRA working definition of antisemitism as the basis for their work, including, for example, the German Football League and large companies such as Deutsche Bahn, Daimler and Lufthansa.
One criticism of the IHRA working definition is that its “wording […] is at least misleading”.[17] The focus of the criticism was on the extent to which criticism of the actions of Israeli governments would be understood as antisemitism and the extent to which antisemitism is fundamentally different from racism and other ideologies of inequality.[18] Here, too, it was claimed that the IHRA working definition of antisemitism – or the extension adopted by the German government – leads to restrictions on freedom of expression, art and assembly.
Further measures
Before October 7, 2023, a whole series of other measures had already been adopted that directly or indirectly affected the fight against antisemitism. It is not possible to list and discuss them all individually here. However, the ban on activities and the raids against the Shiite Lebanese terrorist organization Hezbollah in Germany (2020)[19], the so-called Network Enforcement Act – NetzDG (2017) and the measures announced by the Minister of State for Culture and the Media following the debate on antisemitic works of art at documenta fifteen should be highlighted in particular.
After October 7
October 7 and the increasing threat to Jews in Germany as a result of threats by Hamas also led to parliamentary and political measures. The first and most obvious consequence was the strengthening of security measures for Jewish institutions in consultation between federal and state interior ministers and Jewish communities.[20]
Die PFLP-Vorfeldorganisation Samidoun feiert die Terrorangriffe gegen Israel als „Sieg des Widerstands“. Sie verteilt auf der Sonnenallee in Berlin-Neukölln Süßigkeiten. pic.twitter.com/LD2unnOxpK
— Ruben Gerczikow (@RubenGerczi) October 7, 2023
Tweet reads: The PFLP’s front organization Samidoun celebrates the terrorist attacks against Israel as a “victory of resistance.” They distribute sweets on Sonnenallee in Berlin-Neukölln.
In particular, the cheering by actors and supporters of the PFLP front organization Samidoun was taken as an opportunity to call for bans on pro-Palestinian expressions of solidarity at gatherings or in schools. In a circular dated October 13, the Senator for Education, Youth and Family of the State of Berlin called for the carrying of non-criminal symbols – such as stickers with inscriptions like “Free Palestine” or the so-called Palestinian scarf, the kufiya – to be banned in order to maintain peace in schools. The proportionality of these measures should be assessed by those responsible on the ground.[21] In some cases, pro-Palestinian demonstrations were banned if checks revealed that there had been criminal offenses such as incitement to hatred in the past in connection with the organizers. However, pro-Palestinian protagonists have often claimed in the media that these were blanket bans on gatherings, which is not the case. A large number of assemblies were also banned. To this day, conditions apply to pro-Palestinian gatherings in Berlin that prohibit the promotion of Hezbollah, Hamas, PFLP, Samidoun and Hizb ut-Tahrir.
An effective fight against all antisemitism can only be one that addresses antisemitism as a phenomenon of society as a whole.
On October 12, Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) called for a ban on Hamas and Samidoun in his government statement, which was implemented by the Federal Minister of the Interior on November 2.[22] Faeser also dissolved the German branch of Samidoun. In this context, it was criticized that such a ban was only implemented after the terror of October 7, despite Hamas’ clearly eliminatory and antisemitic orientation. The same applies to Samidoun, whose links to the PFLP were well known. Moreover, it took almost two weeks between the Chancellor’s declaration and the implementation of the ban by the Federal Minister of the Interior.
In addition to a number of immediate measures, there were others that were more long-term in nature. These include the motions by the governing coalition and the CDU/CSU parliamentary group on November 9, the decision by the Conference of Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs and the increase in funding for Jewish institutions and organizations that carry out educational work and monitoring in the area of antisemitism, which was decided as part of the budget process. The motions were referred to committee work in a related Bundestag debate and will subsequently be discussed further.[23]
Classification of the measures
It has been shown that, regardless of the specific context of post-Nazi society, combating antisemitism through state measures is often accompanied by difficult legal balancing processes. These processes are made more challenging by the largely inadequate examination of the German past, especially in the context of social debates.
The complexity of this even increases when one considers that German society is not only post-Nazi, but also post-colonial. It must therefore be emphasized that not only have antisemitism, National Socialism and the Shoah been insufficiently addressed – apart from (historical) academic research – but also colonialism, racism and Porajmos.
An effective fight against all antisemitism can only be one that addresses antisemitism as a phenomenon of society as a whole. The appointment of antisemitism commissioners and the adoption of a common definition appear to be fundamentally in line with this goal. NASAS also complies with this. Despite all this, these are the first steps in a young field of political activity. As Salzborn has noted, this is still in its initial phase despite the first steps that have been taken.
In the wake of October 7, a number of measures were called for that obviously attempted to instrumentalize the fight against antisemitism for other political agendas.
At the same time, it must be emphasized that the criticism that antisemitism would be fought particularly resolutely if externalization were possible has a true core. In the wake of October 7, a number of measures were called for that obviously attempted to instrumentalize the fight against antisemitism for other political agendas. In particular, it appears that the demand for consequences under residence law – the effectiveness of which can be doubted – seemed to be a continuation of a previously parallel debate on migration policy on the one hand, and an attempt to present quick and simplistic solutions on the other. The doubts about this demand could be justified by the fact that a large number of the actors who triggered this debate held German passports, that the withdrawal of passports would only be possible for dual nationals anyway and that it could not happen because of actions that took place in the past.
It cannot be denied that one-sidedness and the reproduction of racism occur time and again. This is particularly evident in the behavior of the largely extreme right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD). In 2020, for example, the AfD’s Facebook page stated that “right-wing extremists with antisemitic prejudices” were “quantitatively and qualitatively” only of “minor importance” compared to “Muslim hatred of Jews”.[24] The attempt to relativize the antisemitism of the so-called “center” of society and the political right and to exaggerate the importance of antisemitism in the political left and communities marked as “Muslim” and “migrant” can be seen again and again. Neither antisemitism on the political left[25] nor in Muslim communities[26] can be negated. But firstly, it must be noted that antisemitism in socialist and feminist movements is “historically the exception, not the rule”, precisely because they “fundamentally question and reflect on structural dimensions of bourgeois socialization more than conservative or religious movements.”[27] Secondly, it must be made clear that the fact that antisemitism also exists in Muslim communities can rather be seen as evidence of its overall social significance.
Even if the police crime statistics are repeatedly criticized in this context, as they, among other things, blanketly label unrelated antisemitic incidents as “right-wing”, it can be stated that antisemitism continues to be of enormous importance[28] within right-wing movements and that antisemitic violence from the right has by no means decreased. Both the attacks in Halle (Saale) and Hanau and the murder of Walter Lübcke were caused by antisemitic conspiracy ideologies, which are spread by right-wing actors in particular. There must therefore be no “offsetting” if antisemitism is to be combated sustainably and decisively.
Conclusion
The field of state measures in the fight against antisemitism is relatively young. In this respect, it is always necessary to critically review the effectiveness of these measures. Criticism of the measures is therefore absolutely necessary. It is always necessary to question the motivation and to consistently expose instrumentalization and externalization. After all, this kind of approach is grist to the mill of those who reject the fight against antisemitism across the board because they do not (or do not want to) recognize its significance and extent.
Various studies in the past have found that between 20 and 30 percent of German society has internalized latent or manifest antisemitic stereotypes. The number of those who have a closed world view and can no longer be reached by educational measures is likely to be relatively small. In this respect, these educational measures are of enormous importance. They are currently supported primarily by civil society initiatives which, however, are dependent on state rather than private funding due to German characteristics. In this respect, a “Democracy Promotion Act”, as envisaged by the current government, could be of great benefit. It could secure the work of smaller initiatives in particular in the long term. At the same time, however, it is also clear that antisemitism plays a major role in radicalization. As a result, perpetrators in whose worldview antisemitism forms a major bracket, e.g. in the sense of a conspiracy narrative, repeatedly take action. The cruelty of the past few years has shown just how great the threat to Jews is. In this respect, at a time when antisemitism is becoming increasingly open and violent, it seems essential for political decision-makers to pursue a holistic strategy against antisemitism. In addition to safeguarding civil society initiatives, this includes a critical review of the education system. It must be part of the entire educational pathway, from school to university to adult education, to learn the ability to act in the confrontation with antisemitism. Criminal measures are also part of this. It can largely be said that there is currently a lack of knowledge transfer and awareness-raising.
Monty Ott
Read part one of Monty Ott’s report here.
Monty Ott is a political writer and a consultant for combating antisemitism and promoting Jewish life in the office of Marlene Schönberger (Greens), a member of the German Bundestag. He has been active in educational work countering antisemitism for over a decade. In early 2023, together with Ruben Gerczikow, he published “‘Wir lassen uns nicht unterkriegen’ – Junge jüdische Politik in Deutschland” (“‘ We will not be defeated’ – Young Jewish Politics in Germany”) with the publishing house Hentrich&Hentrich.
Notes
| 1 | https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Koalitionsvertrag/Koalitionsvertrag_2021-2025.pdf |
| 2, 3 | Salzborn, Samuel: Wehrlose Demokratie? Antisemitismus und die Bedrohung der politischen Ordnung, Leipzig, 2024, p. 20. |
| 4 | https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2018/04/ernennung-klein.html |
| 5 | https://www.antisemitismusbeauftragter.de/Webs/BAS/DE/beauftragter/amt-und-person/amt-und-person-node.html |
| 6 | https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/004/1900444.pdf |
| 7 | https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/heimat-integration/wehrhafte-demokratie/nationale-strategie-gegen-antisemitismus/nationale-strategie-gegen-antisemitismus-node.html |
| 8 | https://www.antisemitismusbeauftragter.de/SharedDocs/downloads/Webs/BAS/DE/nasas.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5 |
| 9 | https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/warum-bremens-judische-gemeinde-auf-einen-antisemitismusbeauftragten-verzichten-will-4219567.html |
| 10 | https://www.fraenkischertag.de/lokales/bamberg/politik/bamberg-patrick-nitzsche-ist-neuer-antisemitismusbeauftragter-art-121019 |
| 11 | https://www.berlin.de/ba-lichtenberg/politik-und-verwaltung/beauftragte/antisemitismus/ |
| 12 | https://gruene-jugend-bayern.de/nein-zu-antisemitismus-nein-zu-bds/ |
| 13 | https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/101/1910191.pdf |
| 14 | https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/822426/2becb6b18e82e62acfdc5c8fe70a84c4/WD-3-287-20-pdf-data.pdf |
| 15 | https://rsw.beck.de/aktuell/daily/meldung/detail/ovg-berlin-brandenburg-israel-boykott-bewegung-scheitert-erneut-mit-klage-gegen-bundestagsbeschluss |
| 16 | This paragraph was taken almost unchanged from: Gerczikow, Ruben / Ott, Monty: “Wir lassen uns nicht unterkriegen” – Junge jüdische Politik in Deutschland (TN: “We won’t let them get us down” – Young Jewish politics in Germany), Leipzig, 2023, p. 34. |
| 17 | https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/52345/1/Hidalgo2022_Article_DerIsraelbezogeneAntisemitismu.pdf |
| 18 | Aleida Assmann: Wie viel Geschichte braucht die Zukunft? (TN: How much history does the future need?) In: Merkur 75, issue 869, (October 2021), p. 5-17, here p. 15 f. |
| 19 | https://taz.de/Betaetigungsverbot-fuer-Terrorgruppe/!5682237/ |
| 20 | https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/newsletter-und-abos/bulletin/rede-der-bundesministerin-des-innern-und-fuer-heimat-nancy-faeser–2236120 |
| 21 | https://rsw.beck.de/aktuell/daily/meldung/detail/verfassungsrechtler–verbote-von-pro-palaestina-demos-problematisch |
| 22 | https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2023/11/vereinsverbot-hamas-samidoun.html#:~:text=Bundesinnenministerin%20Nancy%20Faeser%20verbietet%20die,Palestinian%20Solidarity%20Network%22%20in%20Deutschland. |
| 23 | The text was submitted by March 1, 2024, at which point there was no information on the further course of the application deliberations. |
| 24 | Quoted from: Wehner, Markus: “Israels falsche Freunde”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28.01.2020, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/die-afd-und-der-antisemitismus-israels-falsche-freunde- 16605456.html (accessed on 03.10.2023). |
| 25 | https://www.zeit.de/kultur/2023-01/antisemitismus-linke-bewegungen-judentum-politik/komplettansicht |
| 26 | https://ajcgermany.org/system/files/document/AJC%20Berlin_Antisemitismus%20in%20Deutschland_Eine%20Repr%C3%A4sentativbefragung.pdf |
| 27 | Salzborn, Samuel: Wehrlose Demokratie? Antisemitismus und die Bedrohung der politischen Ordnung, Leipzig, 2024, p. 27. |
| 28 | https://www.idz-jena.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PDFS_WSD8/WsD8_Beitrag_Gideon_Botsch_.pdf |
Related article
