Have you heard of Herman Brusselmans? He is the author of the following lines, which appeared in August 2024 in a popular Belgian magazine: “I see an image of a little Palestinian boy crying and screaming, calling for his mother who is buried under the rubble. I become so furious that I want to stab every Jew I meet in the throat with a sharp knife.” Less than a year later, the case brought forward by a Jewish organization ended in acquittal. In a two-part investigation, Rafaël Amselem explains why—and how. A journey to Belgium, where these words are (almost) no longer shocking.
On August 6, 2024, the popular Flemish weekly magazine Humo published the following lines: “I see an image of a little Palestinian boy crying and screaming, calling for his mother buried under the rubble. I imagine that this boy is my own son Roman, and the mother is my partner Lena. I become so furious that I want to stab every Jew I meet in the throat with a sharp knife.” These lines are taken from a column on Gaza[1] entitled “The Middle East is going to explode, the Third World War is coming.” The author is a renowned writer and columnist in Flanders: Herman Brusselmans.
We recall Houria Bouteldja, for whom encountering a Jewish child wearing a kippah raises questions about “the possible prelude to her inner ruin”.[2] Brusselmans, for his part, does not question himself any more than he discriminates. Child or adult, kippah or not, any Jew he encounters after Gaza awakens in him a fantasy of antisemitic murder. And he spreads this fantasy in black and white in the press.
Obviously, since Belgium is a democracy that takes antisemitism seriously, one can imagine that the controversy was immediate. Obviously, political condemnations followed. And obviously, television studios were packed. Was antisemitism being trivialized? The prosecutor immediately took up the case. Humo published a flat apology. Herman Brusselmans was fired and then ostracized by anti-racist activists. On Monday, March 11, 2025, the first court ruling was handed down: the author was convicted of incitement to hatred. Really, there would be nothing surprising about this in a relatively healthy democratic society, where Jews can exist publicly and feel protected.
Unfortunately, none of this happened. To understand how Belgium deals with cases of antisemitism, we clearly need to abandon any form of reassuring evidence. Because this is what really happened in Belgium after the publication of the August 6, 2024 issue of Humo:
Instead of controversy, there was media silence. The microphones were abandoned. The television sets were empty. Virtually no press articles reported on the incident. On the judicial front, it did not occur to the prosecutor to take up the case himself. The only complaints filed came from Jewish organizations. A trial does take place, during which the prosecutor argues for acquittal on the grounds of freedom of expression. Don’t we have the absolute right to shout from the rooftops that we want to kill Jews? In any case, the judge found the argument very convincing and supported the prosecutor in his deliberations. Everyone agreed, with a serious and knowing nod, that the statement was outrageous, but that it was nonetheless considered to be the author’s opinion. Freedom of expression is definitely a convenient excuse.
To top it all off, the Joods Informatie-en Documentatiecentrum (JID), an Antwerp-based organization fighting antisemitism that initiated the proceedings[3] In a new twist, fighting antisemitic remarks now comes at a high price. Perhaps Jews should start turning the other cheek? Because at this rate, they will soon have to apologize for feeling offended when someone expresses a desire to slit their throats.
The Brusselmans case, or rather the non-case, is a challenge to understanding. We have tried to understand what seems to be allowing calls for violence against Jews in Belgium today. Ultimately, Brusselmans illustrates Belgium’s unease with antisemitism. In investigating this case, we therefore sought to shed light on some of the causes of this unease. Let’s head to Brussels.
The normalization of antisemitism: the Belgian (textbook) case
The Brusselmans case can only be understood in the broader context of a worrying rise in antisemitism. In this respect, Belgium is not so different from the general trend, which sees the radicalization of anti-Zionist rhetoric surrounding the war in Gaza accompanied by acts targeting Jews. Here are a few figures.
Patrick Charlier is director of Unia, the inter-federal agency for combating discrimination and an expert on issues relating to racism in Belgium. We meet him at his offices in Brussels. The picture he paints of Belgian antisemitism is quite damning: 280 reports of antisemitism in 2023. “A record number of reports, never seen before,” he observes. Until then, the level had been stable, averaging around 80 to 100 reports per year. The break is clear: between October 7 and December 7, 91 reports were recorded, 66 of which were clearly classified as antisemitic after verification. “That means 66 in two months. If we take the average, that’s 33 per month, whereas the previous year we had between four and five reports per month.” .“
This deterioration has become permanent: ”Throughout 2024, we continued to record reports and open files on antisemitism.“ According to Charlier, this surge is part of a longer-standing structural problem: ” I always used to say that there was persistent antisemitism in the background.“ The context of war in the Middle East undeniably makes Jews a prime target for hate crimes: ”After October 7, we know that Jews in Belgium are in a fragile situation and under threat. They are systematically suspected of being accomplices or perpetrators.” .“
The nature of the acts reported is also revealing: ”The incidents of antisemitism that come to our attention are mainly hate speech and acts of hatred, with relatively little discrimination in employment or housing.” Most cases involve insults, graffiti, and attacks targeting Jews or people identified as such. “We have had Jewish families who have been attacked in the street. They were Orthodox Jews, clearly visible, who were targeted,” he explains.
Unia’s analysis highlights the high prevalence of antisemitism in Belgium relative to the general population. “We receive many more reports about Muslims than about Jews, but there are also many more Muslims in Belgium than Jews. If we relate the number of incidents of antisemitism to the Jewish population as a whole, it remains a significant phenomenon,” Charlier emphasizes. As historian Joël Kotek notes, “if Belgian Jews are vastly outnumbered by Belgian Muslims (by a ratio of at least 1 to 16) but report a similar level of incidents, this means that the number of acts targeting Jews is particularly worrying.”
October 7 therefore had a considerable impact on the explosion of antisemitism in Belgium, Patrick Charlier points out: “We published a report on antisemitism in January 2024. The first draft was ready a week before October 7. When we saw what happened on the 7th, we felt it was impossible to publish the report without including an appendix on the period that followed.” The final picture is unambiguous: antisemitism in Belgium is long-standing, structural, and now galvanized by dynamics linked to the war in Gaza.
This finding was confirmed and even amplified by the survey conducted in May 2024 by the Jonathas Institute with IPSOS Belgium, published in May 2025[4]. To date, this is the largest opinion poll ever conducted on antisemitism in Belgium. The figures are staggering: of the 15 antisemitic prejudices tested (“There are too many Jews in Belgium,” “Jews are too present in the financial and banking sector,” “Jews often consider themselves superior to others,” etc.), eight are considered true by more than a third of Belgians. Seventy-four percent of those surveyed believe that “Jews are very close-knit,” 42% believe they are wealthier than average, 39% believe they have very powerful lobbies, and 28% consider them “not really Belgians like the rest of us.” Even religious tropes are resurfacing: 19% of Belgians still believe that Jews are responsible for the death of Christ.
A striking feature is the prevalence of so-called secondary antisemitism, defined as the exploitation of the memory of the Shoah to discredit Jews today. “This antisemitism, theorized by German social scientists, explains contemporary antisemitism, not despite Auschwitz, but because of Auschwitz,” the document states. One of its two authors, Joël Kotek, historian, sums it up as follows: “We do not forgive the Jews for the Shoah,” meaning that we blame them for the guilt it places on the European conscience. In this context, which allows this guilt to be reversed onto Israel, Israel is Nazified: ultimately, the Jews are no less guilty than the Europeans. Perhaps they are even more so. The report goes on to say: “This reveals a mechanism of avoidance aimed at minimizing the Shoah and antisemitism, seeing them as instruments of power for Jews and, at the same time, criminalizing Israel, a double phenomenon associated with the concept of distortion of the Shoah.” Thus, 41% of Belgians believe that “Jews use the Shoah to defend their interests,” and 35% say that “Jews are doing to the Palestinians what the Germans did to them.” In Flanders, the latter statement reaches 47%.
The trivialization and reversal of the memory of the Shoah accompanies a radical anti-Zionism which, according to the same report, has become a fundamental driving force behind contemporary antisemitism in Belgium. The link between Israel and Jews is used to justify rejection: 49% of Belgians on the far left, for example, believe that Jews exploit antisemitism, and 52% think that they behave like Nazis towards Palestinians. Hostility towards Israel thus becomes a gateway to broader resentment. It spares neither the elites nor the younger generations. Among 18-24 year olds, 19% want Israel to disappear in favor of a Palestinian state “from the river to the sea” — compared to 3% among those over 55.
Belgian anti-Zionism thus appears to be a major component of contemporary antisemitism. Joël Kotek gives us the particularly damning example of the Aalst festival: “Orthodox Jews are caricatured as insects with big noses and wearing keffiyehs.” This antisemitism is based on radical anti-Zionist rhetoric that circulates in most Belgian political parties. The various left-wing parties compete with each other in making anti-Zionist statements. Fouad Ahidar, a former Flemish socialist MP who now heads his own strictly communitarian party, described the Hamas attack on October 7 as a “small response” to decades of Israeli “massacres.” [5] In the same vein, several government officials refused to describe Hamas as a terrorist organization, while others likened Israel to Nazi Germany.[6] At the Free University of Brussels, a student collective called “Université populaire de Bruxelles” occupied a building in May 2024 to protest the university’s ties to Israeli institutions. The group posted messages on Instagram such as “No Zionists in my neighborhood, no neighborhood for Zionists,” which were deemed antisemitic by the ULB administration and the Jonathas Institute, which filed a complaint for incitement to hatred. Acts of vandalism are also prevalent. On November 22, 2023, at least 85 Jewish graves were vandalized in a cemetery in Charleroi, with Stars of David torn off. On December 19, 2023, swastikas and Stars of David were painted on graves in a Jewish cemetery in Kraainem.[7]
Dorian de Meeûs, editor-in-chief of the national daily newspaper La Libre, draws a link between the virulence of this anti-Zionism and the rise of communitarianism, which found expression at the ballot box in the elections following October 7. During our meeting, he informed us that “a party, which can only be described as communitarian, such as the TFA (Team Fouad Ahidar) in Brussels, has grown significantly, winning three seats”; this party campaigned mainly on the conflict in Gaza and ritual slaughter. Senator Viviane Teitelbaum, who has been deeply engaged in antisemitism issues in the Belgian Parliament, is saddened by the turn the political debate is taking: “There has been an anti-Israeli obsession, particularly during the last election campaign. Flemish Socialist Minister Caroline Gennez, for example, asked: ‘Is Germany really going to find itself on the wrong side of history twice?’, referring to German support for Israel in the Gaza war.“ Joël Kotek describes these anti-Zionist outbursts as ”tertiary antisemitism”: opportunistic and electioneering, seeking, in his view, to capture the vote of Muslims in Belgium who are suspected of being sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.
In short, Brusselmans represents a widespread trend today: the alliance of radical anti-Zionism and secondary antisemitism. But if he can embody it so explicitly, it is also because of local factors. Joël Kotek highlights one of the specific characteristics of the Flemish region: “Secondary antisemitism is indeed more pronounced in Flanders.” The Jonathas Institute survey makes a similar observation regarding the prevalence of antisemitic stereotypes: “Flemish respondents exceed the Belgian average in 10 of the 15 prejudices tested.” Just as there are two major Jewish communities in Belgium—the secular community in Brussels and the Hasidic community in Antwerp—there are two different attitudes toward antisemitism, Joël Kotek points out, between the French-speaking and Flemish sides.
This difference with the French-speaking part can be explained in part by the Flemish collaborationist past: “In Brussels, during the Shoah, 35% of Jews were killed, compared to 67% in Antwerp,” the historian recalls. “Brusselmans exorcises this shame,” he interprets. This hostility linked to the Shoah is compounded by stronger Catholic roots on this side of Belgium, which feed traditional antisemitism (primary in Joël Kotek’s terms).
Belgian law and hate speech: a cracked edifice
With this context in mind, let us return to the heart of the matter and its legal intricacies.
The Belgian justice system’s handling of the Brusselmans case is characterized first and foremost by the fragmentation of the legal machinery. In the absence of a unified and rigorous investigation, the case has broken up into several parallel proceedings, as if the seriousness of the remarks prevented a coherent response from being applied. Julien Uyttendaele, lawyer for four Jewish organizations—the Coordinating Committee of Jewish Organizations in Belgium (CCOJB), the Forum der Joodse Organisaties (FJO), the Jonathas Institute, and the Centre Communautaire Laïc Juif (CCLJ)[8] – civil parties in one of the cases, comments ironically on the conduct of the case: “Here, the victims’ greatest enemy is the victims themselves.” The expression is brutal, but sums up the procedural chaos that partly explains the current failure of the proceedings. Three complaints. Two of them with civil party status. Plus two direct citations—a Belgian legal technique that allows a plaintiff to bring an author directly before a criminal court without going through the public prosecutor’s office.
The first complaint with civil party status was filed on August 22, 2024, by the European Jewish Association (EJA), a pan-European organization representing and defending the interests of the Jewish community.[9] It was ruled inadmissible on October 18, 2024, on the grounds that its statutes did not include any mission to combat antisemitism, resulting in a lack of standing to bring proceedings.
The second complaint, with civil party status, was filed by an association of several Jewish organizations[10] on October 17. Unlike the previous complaint, its admissibility is not contested, and the judgment is still pending.
The third complaint, without civil action, was filed by Unia. The institution did not wish to join the proceedings and therefore limited itself to filing a complaint.
As for the two direct citations filed with the Ghent Criminal Court, the first was brought by three individuals from the Jewish community, and the second by the JID. The acquittal on March 11 concerns this latest proceeding. Following this decision, Walter Van Steenbrugge, the lawyer representing the first direct summons, filed a request for the recusal of the judge in charge of the case: the same causes producing the same effects, the same judge who had acquitted Brusselmans the first time was preparing to acquit him a second time. The latter therefore resigned from his duties. The case will soon be heard by another judge.
This procedural plurality has been endorsed by the Belgian judicial institutions, as the judges refused to join the cases despite requests from several lawyers involved in the proceedings. “This is absurd, contrary to the principle of good administration of justice, and not without a certain bias,” denounced Mr. Uyttendaele. The result? Fragmented, potentially contradictory decisions on statements that pose a crucial problem for the Belgian courts. Admittedly, the proceedings that led to the acquittal say nothing about the cases currently before the courts. But the tone has been set.
In the proceedings brought by Julien Uyttendaele, the first step will be to demonstrate the existence of “sufficient charges.” .“
This is where a first legal point arises: in Belgian law, ‘charges’ are not ”evidence.” At the outset of proceedings, the aim is simply to determine whether, at the end of the preliminary investigation, the evidence gathered is sufficient to justify referral to the criminal court, which will then judge the merits of the case. In short, the chamber does not rule on the guilt or innocence of a person: it acts as a sorting office, dismissing cases where it considers it unlikely that a conviction will subsequently be obtained before a criminal court. In such cases, the case is dismissed.
In the context of this procedure, the Ghent Public Prosecutor’s Office has requested that the case be dismissed, considering that it does not even warrant a hearing before a court of first instance.
A very special intent – tolerance for the expression of hatred?
Can the prosecutor’s position be understood in light of the specific nature of Belgian law? A second legal point must be made: when it comes to hate, two laws are particularly important in Belgium. First, the “Moureaux” law of July 30, 1981, which aims to punish certain acts inspired by racism or xenophobia. Antisemitism is included under the criterion of ancestry: protection against discriminatory acts or statements applies to persons targeted because of their perceived family or ethnic origins. Senator Viviane Teitelbaum points out that antisemitism is therefore not explicitly mentioned in Belgian law: ” In Belgium, you cannot file a complaint for antisemitism, as there is no legal definition of the term. You have to invoke the criterion of descent, which includes antisemitism. This poses a particular problem in terms of counting: if a complaint is not filed under the criterion of descent, some cases of antisemitism slip under the radar.” Secondly, the law of March 23, 1995, which prohibits Holocaust denial, also includes the justification or minimization of the Shoah.
This is a fundamental difference between Belgian law and its French counterpart. In Belgium, offensive or hateful speech is not punishable in itself. For a statement to fall under the law, it must be shown that there was an intention to incite hatred, violence, or discrimination.
This legal criterion, known as “special intent”, sets a high standard of proof, explains Patrick Charlier, director of Unia: “In Belgium, there is a requirement known as special intent. It must be possible to demonstrate that behind the statements for which the perpetrator is being prosecuted, there is an intention on their part to incite a third party to commit an act of hatred, discrimination or violence.”
This is a significant distinction, which has long been criticized by Joël Rubinfeld, president of the Belgian League Against Antisemitism (LBCA): “The criterion of incitement to hatred also very clearly limits the possibilities for prosecution, since it must be possible to demonstrate the author’s intention to incite antisemitic hatred or violence. An insult, such as ‘dirty Jew’, is not considered incitement.”
However, it was this criterion of specific intent that was used by the chamber to conclude that there were no grounds for prosecution. It is surprising, as Joël Kotek points out, that this argument based on the specificity of Belgian legislation was accepted in the Brusselmans case: “The call for violence is explicit here: he talks about taking a knife and stabbing someone.” Viviane Teitelbaum goes even further: “If that’s not incitement, then what is it, in concrete terms?”
“The state, through the public prosecutor’s office, is sending out a terrible message: Belgian society is not affected by this kind of statement,” regrets Mr. Uyttendaele. “Tomorrow, I could say that I want to stab every prosecutor I see on the street in the throat!” he continued, highlighting the absurdity of the logic claimed by the public prosecutor’s office and the Ghent Criminal Court. However, there is no evidence that the author of such threats against members of the public prosecutor’s office would get off as lightly as Brusselmans… In addition to the legal argument, it remains to be understood what cultural context accounts for the particular tolerance towards antisemitic threats.
What can be hoped for from the rest of the legal proceedings after these setbacks? Mr. Uyttendaele hopes to have the case referred to the Ghent Criminal Court: “This is the first step in a long journey. Before this judge, we will have to consider whether he should be recused, given that he has already ruled on the case. The ultimate goal is to have all these cases heard before the Court of Appeal. We will then be faced with new interlocutors, whom I hope will be more enlightened, both at the level of the public prosecutor’s office and at the level of the court.” The Brusselmans case is not over yet.
Brusselmans, a local product of a specific Flemish climate
As Joël Kotek pointed out, Brusselmans is indicative of a local context: secondary Flemish antisemitism and the guilt associated with the Shoah, which the columnist sought to exorcise.
But it is not only in terms of antisemitism that the Flemish factor is important: it is also the story of provocation, of a newspaper, of a unique and, above all, hermetic linguistic and cultural space.
Dorian de Meeûs, editor-in-chief of La Libre Belgique, introduces us to the specificities of the Flemish public and media space. He welcomes us to his offices, a large building with immaculate white interiors. Upon arrival, we see him through a glass office door, surrounded by around twenty people gathered around a table, seemingly concluding an editorial meeting. The decor is sober: a “La Libre” banner hangs from a railing on the floor above, overlooking the room, and, curiously, a sculpture of a calf—not made of gold, readers will be relieved to know! Once the meeting is over, we retreat to a workspace.
The tone is set right away: “I would never have let that pass in La Libre Belgique. I don’t think the French-speaking press in general would ever have let that pass.” According to de Meeûs, one of the keys to understanding the case lies in the profound differences between French-speaking and Flemish Belgium—not only linguistic, but also cultural and political. “There is a difference between the Flemish community and the French-speaking community. On the French-speaking side, there is much less tolerance for this type of behavior, even in the context of humor.“ This difference extends to the relationship with the far right, which is ”constantly invited onto TV shows and participates in game shows. This is not at all the case on the French-speaking side.” The far right, he adds, has been on the rise since the 1980s. Dorain de Meeûs reminds us that the far-right Vlaams Belang party was founded by people who collaborated with Nazi Germany.
On a whole range of issues, the divide between the Walloon and Flemish worlds is in fact akin to a real segmentation. These are not simply cultural differences, but hermetic media spaces. This was confirmed to us by Jérémie Tojerow, head of Golem Belgium, whom we also contacted. He emphasizes that the media silence surrounding Brusselmans’ comments in Belgium must be understood in light of this disconnection between media spaces. “The Walloons are largely unconcerned, if not uninformed, about the Flemish media, and vice versa; and on the Flemish side, people are immune to outrageous comments like those made by Brusselmans,” summarizes Dorian de Meeûs.
The interview also reveals the cultural divide between Flanders and Wallonia in terms of tolerance for verbal excess, radical humor, and more broadly, a form of uninhibited freedom of expression. This divide cannot be reduced to political posturing or media bias: according to the journalist, it stems from a distinct “cultural habitus” deeply rooted in the history and collective sensibilities of Belgium’s two linguistic communities.
The antisemitic caricatures at the Aalst carnival, mentioned above, are a telling example of the extent of this “uninhibitedness.” “You would never have a carnival like this on the French-speaking side. It’s cultural.” But this goes far beyond the scope of this event. “When I say that the Flemish are more radical, it’s because they generally have fewer filters. Their logic is as follows: it’s humor, the public is intelligent enough to be self-critical”. This attitude is reflected in editorial practices: while self-censorship is the norm on the French-speaking side (“I check three things every evening: our cartoonist’s drawing, the editorial and the front page,” insists Dorian de Meeûs), Flemish editorial teams seem to allow more leeway for controversial or transgressive expressions. Jérémie Torejow confirms this: the publication of Brusselmans’ comments should not be seen as a deliberate attempt to be marginal, because Humo is a thoroughly mainstream magazine.
In short, the Brusselmans affair has catalyzed many dynamics that are particularly pronounced in Belgium, or even unique to it: the pernicious mixture of secondary antisemitism and anti-Zionism, the questionable interpretation of a very specific form of intent, and the extravagant license of a specifically Flemish spirit of provocation.
Part II of the investigation next week…
Rafaël Amselem
Notes
| 1 | Translated from Dutch: « Het Midden-Oosten zal exploderen, er is een Derde Wereldoorlog op komst ». The column, which has since been removed from the Humo website, can be viewed at the following link: https://www.netkwesties.nl/documenten/20240804%20Humo%20Column%20Herman%20Brusselmans.pdf? |
| 2 | ”The worst thing is the disappearance of my indifference towards you, the possible prelude to my inner ruin,” in Les Blancs, les juifs et nous [ET: The Whites, the Jews and us], La Fabrique, 2016. |
| 3 | The Joods Informatie- en Documentatiecentrum (JID) is a Belgian association founded in 2024 in Antwerp, dedicated to combating antisemitism in Flanders. It takes legal, media and educational action to defend the rights of Jews in Belgium. |
| 4 | Institut Jonathas, L’antisémitisme en Belgique : a perfect storm, April 2025 |
| 5 | Belgium: complaint of antisemitism against MP dismissed,” Times of Israel, May 8, 2025. |
| 6 | Joel Rubinfeld, president of the Belgian league against antisemitism, details in an op-ed for Le Point on April 20, 2024 a list of antisemitic incidents that took place in the aftermath of October 7. |
| 7 | « Plainte contre le mouvement étudiant anti-Israël ‘Université Populaire de Bruxelles’ », Times of Israel, November 15, 2024.
“Authorities launch probe after at least 85 Jewish graves damaged in Belgian cemetery,” Times of Israel, November 24, 2023. B’nai B’rith, “Belgian Jewish cemetery vandalized with swastikas,” December 19, 2023. |
| 8 | The CCOJB is the federation and voice of the Jewish organisations of Belgium. The FJO is an organization representing and defending the Jewish community in Flanders. The Institut Jonathas is a center for study and action against antisemitism that brings together academics, lawyers, communication experts, and activists committed to the fight against antisemitism. The CCLJ defines itself as a secular and humanist Jewish institution, rooted in the principles of free inquiry, tolerance, and the rejection of all dogma. Its main missions include promoting secular Judaism, combating antisemitism, racism and fascism, and strengthening solidarity with Israel and Jewish communities around the world. |
| 9 | The EJA acts as a federation of hundreds of Jewish communities and organizations working to strengthen Jewish identity, combat antisemitism and promote religious rights, particularly with regard to practices such as kashrut and circumcision. The EJA maintains close relations with European institutions and national governments to ensure that the voice of European Jews is heard on political, social and cultural issues. It is led by Rabbi Menachem Margolin. |
| 10 | The Coordinating Committee of Jewish Organizations in Belgium (CCOJB), the Forum der Joodse Organisaties (FJO), the Jonathas Institute, and the Centre Communautaire Laïc Juif (CCLJ) |
