Towards a new exile?

I have proposed drawing a distinction between antisemitism and Judeophobia. For a short time, I thought I had found an equivalent distinction in Bruno Karsenti’s latest book. He does indeed separate antisemitism from anti-Judaism. I do not dispute the validity of his approach, far from it. I would have been even more satisfied if we had agreed. But I believe that our proposals do not overlap.

In my opinion, there is a fundamental difference between antisemitism and Judeophobia. Antisemitism claims to be based on understanding and reason; it puts forward socio-political arguments. These arguments may be fallacious or even substantially false, but they often may be persuasively formulated. As Hannah Arendt says in the opening of The Origins of Totalitarianism, antisemitism thus takes into account the ideological victory of the Enlightenment, and more specifically of the German-language Aufklärung. More generally, it adapts to the demands of the modernity of the moment. This is the case in Germany, where it originated, and it will be the case in France, where it developed.

While antisemitism claims to be based on reason, Judeophobia is based on passion; in the classic list of passions of the soul, the German language had identified hatred, der Hass, hence the noun Judenhass. Hatred does not need arguments, or when it does formulate them, they merely repeat it in discursive form. I refer here to David Hume (A Treatise of Human Nature): hatred does not arise from injustice or crime attributed to others, but the attribution of injustice or crime arises from hatred itself. Thus, accusations of deicide or genocide do not justify hatred; whether overt or latent, hatred preceded the accusation.

Hannah Arendt and many other authors maintain that antisemitism is distinct from the ancient Judenhass. Anti-Jewish sentiment would therefore have persisted only among the backward fringes of the population. More subtly, in The Childhood of a Leader , Sartre depicts how a young, educated, and well-bred Parisian bourgeois fabricates a Judeophobic passion that he does not really feel in order to consolidate his already established reputation as a relentless antisemitic figure. Conversely, it is easy to imagine that antisemitic passion is fueled by the ratiocinations and sophistry of antisemites.

But then came the ideological consequences of the postwar period and the discovery of the death camps: Judeophobia then became, at least in the West, a shameful passion that was forbidden to express; antisemitism, for its part, found that its arguments lacked force in the face of certain events. It had to keep a low profile. While West Germany succeeded in its reconstruction by shamelessly using engineers trained by Nazism, and the US did the same in space research, they covered it up with a thick veil.

During the second half of the 20th century, in the West and its dependencies, the canonical doctrine can be summarized as follows: 1) Judeophobia, belonging to the ancient world, already had only a residual existence in modern societies; 2) antisemitism, which since the end of the 19th century had consigned Judeophobia to oblivion, was itself silenced by the experience of the Second World War; 3) these two closures were definitive.

For a long time, I have believed that the canonical thesis was false on all three points. Its falsity is now clear for all to see, for three reasons.

First, Judeophobic passion had never completely disappeared from modern societies. It may have abandoned certain ancestral themes, such as deicide. In order to express itself openly, it often took on the trappings of reasoned argument and science. Mein Kampf is an example of this. It does not matter that the arguments are biased and the scientific references are charlatanism: they attest to the author’s need to pay homage to modern reason, just as hypocrisy pays homage to virtue. When, on the other hand, a Judeophobe nevertheless felt compelled to keep up appearances in his publications, it was sometimes discovered that his passion was given free rein in the secrecy of his private writings. It is significant that so many personal archives bear witness to this. Consider Frege’s diary, Heidegger’s notebooks, Schmitt’s Glossarium, and Alain’s recently published notes.

Secondly, there are places where Judeophobia has been a constituent element of social cohesion for decades. These include the Arab world and, more specifically, the formerly Christian and Romanized countries where the Arab conquest encountered Christian Judeophobia. Nothing predisposed Islam to reject Jews more bitterly than it rejected Christians, Buddhists, and all non-Muslims. Christianity, on the contrary, could not avoid the question of Judeophobia. The life and death of Jesus compelled it to do so. For a long time, the choice of Judeophobia seemed self-evident. This is no longer the case for all Christians today. It was still the case, both in the East and in Europe, during the Arab expansion. Professional historians argue that the widespread presence of Judeophobia among Christian populations, who had been called upon to convert willingly or by force, had no influence on Islam after the conquest; I am not convinced by this unanimous opinion.

In fact, there was nothing that predisposed Islam to reject Jews more bitterly than it rejected Christians, Buddhists, and all non-Muslims. Christianity, on the contrary, could not avoid the question of Judeophobia.

In any case, there is no doubt about the existence of Judeophobia in the Arab world today. After having long been indifferent to the ideologies of this world, the West is now attaching increasing importance to them. Because its own peace and prosperity are at stake. If it appears that a particular conflict among Arab populations threatens the delicate balance in the West, the latter will seek to eliminate or control the troublemaker. For a long time, Islamism was considered the culprit; in recent years, however, the Jewish presence in the East has been called into question. This presence is seen as the primary obstacle to peace. The fate of the Gaza Strip and the figure of B. Netanyahu have tipped the balance: in the eyes of world opinion, Israel is seen as a rogue state and all Jews, Israeli or otherwise, are seen as accomplices to its crimes. The condemnation had long since been pronounced; remember Durban 2001, the NGO forum that was held in parallel, and the slogan “One bullet, one Jew” that was heard there. Western countries protested at the time. The war in Gaza and B. Netanyahu’s policies have accelerated the course of time: now, the protest of 2001 is no longer in season in the countries that expressed it.

Far from being outraged by Eastern Judeophobia, many Westerners share it. Simple minds blame the growing number of Muslims within the population. Let us accept as a fact that Western Islam exists; there is no reason why it should not show solidarity with Eastern Islam. Let us accept as a possibility that this solidarity includes Judeophobic sentiment; this would come as no surprise. However, we must be careful not to attribute the rise of Western antisemitism solely to the existence of European Islam. For it is something else entirely: we are not witnessing the return of antisemitism, but the rebirth, on new foundations, of a specifically Western antisemitism. Its causes are internal to the West and fundamentally independent of any reference to Islam.

In this regard, I come to my third point: the West has sought to be the material expression of an idea that was once called progress and that I prefer to call modernity. Social modernity, or democracy; political modernity, or the secular state; modernity of thought: science and technology. However, modernity itself has become suspect in all its aspects: formal democracy in institutional forms, the separation of state and religion, the perceived excessive authority of science, the harmful effects of technology on nature—every day, new grounds for complaint are added to the indictment.

Since the Enlightenment and the Aufklärung, all forms of integration were conceived as consent to modernity. Conversely, it can be said that the valorization of generalized integration was an invention of modernity. Jews took their place within this vast movement. This is not without a paradox: Judaism is one of the oldest religions in the world still practiced today; the requirements of its rites are diametrically opposed to the flexibility of customs so highly praised by modernity. Yet when they do integrate, Jews almost invariably choose the most assertive versions of integral modernity. Their taste for the avant-garde, whether political, artistic, or moral, varies from one individual to another, but while the substance of the integrative gesture may change, its form remains the same.

We are not witnessing a return of antisemitism, but rather the rebirth, on new foundations, of a specifically Western Judeophobia. Its causes are internal to the West and fundamentally independent of any reference to Islam.

After 1945, many of the world’s populations believed that their survival required modernity. Jewish communities were no exception. One might have thought that between the recognition of the death camps and the common desire for modernity, Jewish integration would be part of the general movement. This was partially true. We can assume that by resolutely embarking on the path of formal democracy and techno-scientific innovation, not without sprinkling several touches of secularization throughout, the State of Israel consolidated its own position. As a reward, it benefited from protection from the West. Thus strengthened, it was able to negotiate with anti-modern and anti-integrationist Jews. Those known as the frums.

The system could only be maintained as long as modernity rallied consensus. But modernity, as I said, has become suspect. For clarity’s sake, let’s say that the reversal dates back to the 21st century. In the eyes of non-Westerners, modernity is seen as an invention designed to ensure the supremacy of the white race. Its past is evoked, a past of territorial conquests, subjugation of populations, and cultural predation. They evoke its present, marked by the selfish protection of inherited advantages. They evoke its future, which has become increasingly uncertain since superpowers rivaling the West have developed their own versions of modernity, purged of the faults attributed to the Western version. Putin is developing a Russian modernity, China a Chinese modernity; and there are even suspicions that Trump’s ideologues are thinking of an American modernity, stripped of European influences. Perhaps we will have to accept that there are several modernities that cannot be superimposed on one another. The secession of the United States remains to be confirmed, but we should not believe that Trumpism has a monopoly on it; Barack Obama was already thinking along these lines. The old Western modernity, born of the European Enlightenment, would then be reduced to Europe alone. It would then be one of several possible modernities and, in fact, the least modern of all.

While it is too early to say that the situation has reached its final form, we can glimpse a plausible future. As it has become, the old Western modernity has given way to a descendant. This no longer deserves to be called Western, since it has become specific to Europeans and no longer concerns the United States. It would be better to call it Euro-Western. Similarly, its proponents should be called Euro-Westerners rather than Westerners, and their collective entity determines a Euro-West rather than the West. However, a paradox is obvious: while Russian modernity is accepted by most Russians, Chinese modernity by most Chinese, and American modernity by most Americans, Euro-Western modernity, on the contrary, is not accepted by a majority of Euro-Westerners. In the name of the planet, endangered by science and technology, but also in the name of inequality, which neither social democracy nor state forms are able to reduce.

Euro-Western modernity no longer believes that the balance sheet of its actual achievements is positive overall. Contemplating the realities, it accuses itself of having betrayed its ideal. To accuse itself, in all areas, of constant and systematic violations of equality is to condemn itself without appeal.

I have spoken of inequality and therefore of equality.

If so many suspicions are cast on Euro-Western modernity, they all stem from a single grievance: a failure to achieve equality. I will repeat here the words of Tocqueville: “Democratic peoples have an ardent, insatiable, eternal, invincible passion for equality…” Western modernity wanted to be indissolubly democratic; it therefore wanted to be intrinsically egalitarian. Euro-Western modernity wants to remain faithful to this ideal, but unlike its predecessor, it no longer believes that the balance sheet of its actual achievements is positive overall. Contemplating the realities, it accuses itself of having betrayed its own ideal. To blame itself, in all areas, for constant and systematic violations of equality is to condemn itself without appeal.

When they believed themselves to be integrated into the West, Jews saw themselves as modern. Many Jews in the Euro-West maintain their desire for integration. They cannot therefore escape the suspicion aroused by Euro-Western modernity, outside the Euro-West, of course, but also and perhaps above all within the Euro-West. The Jews of Israel are doubly suspect, as Jews and as Israelis, since their state has only one historical significance: to show that, while fulfilling an immemorial requirement of the Torah—the return to Eretz Israel—they are at the forefront of modernity, in its worst aspects: the transformation of nature (“making the desert bloom”), entrepreneurship, social justice, and military efficiency. Added to this are the constant wounds that Israeli Jews are accused of inflicting on the egalitarian passion. Even when they agree to peace, do they not persist in wanting a state that does not conform to the customs and traditions of the Arab countries that surround them? Without necessarily knowing De Gaulle’s phrase, we come back to his expression “an elite people, self-confident and domineering.”

On this point, there is no point in highlighting Netanyahu’s harshness and the abuses of the IDF, because we are touching on something infinitely deeper: Jewish existence itself undermines equality. The grievance does not only affect Israelis; it extends to all Jews around the world, simply because they are Jews. De Gaulle is no longer enough; we must go back to the source, Tacitus: “with their brothers, loyalty in all circumstances, pity always helpful; against the rest of mankind, hatred and hostility.”

Anti-Jewish passion, anti-Western passion, anti-modern passion, egalitarian passion, anti-European passion on the part of some, anti-American passion on the part of others, anti-Israeli passion on the part of all: Jews find themselves at the confluence of these passions. If Euro-Western opinion persists on its current path, it will conclude that Jews cannot be welcomed anywhere, except temporarily. “From the river to the sea” is the slogan. The ignorance of those who repeat it has been denounced, even though they do not know which river or even which sea is meant. In fact, however, this ignorance is not negative. On the contrary, it leads to an affirmative universalization: wherever there is a river or a sea, no matter how far apart they may be, Jews must be prepared to leave. If I am to believe The Nomos of the Earth, Carl Schmitt would say that the articulation of a river and a sea defines the most general form of a possible territory; therefore, it is proclaimed that no real territory will offer welcome or refuge. This is what I call the new exile, as determined by pro-Palestinianism, without yet knowing it, without yet wanting it, but playing with the idea, like a child playing with dice.