Between staunch supporters and fierce detractors, recognition of the State of Palestine crystallizes sharply divided positions. Each side’s arguments are defensible—as long as they aim to protect both Israel’s security and the Palestinians’ right to self-determination—but the challenge here is to understand what such a gesture would actually achieve: would a declaration of principle have consequences for the future?
The UN Charter stipulates that only “peaceful states” that commit to respecting the content of the Charter itself can become members of its assembly. Palestine is certainly not about to become a full member of the UN, as it is likely that the US veto in the Security Council will continue to prevent this. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the states in this assembly have now unilaterally recognized the State of Palestine, raising the common awareness that the self-determination of the Palestinian people now takes precedence over all other considerations. France, as well as Portugal, England, Australia, and Canada, have now joined this cohort.
Their intention is clearly not anti-Zionist, in the sense that they believe Israel’s interests as a sovereign state would be threatened by such a move. While the intention is causing concern among a large part of Jewish opinion, which questions the timing, it is impossible not to see in the gravity of the situation the need to prevent it from continuing. The intention behind the declaration of recognition is one that is shared by all informed positions at present: to move forward on a road that is currently blocked, to remove the main obstacle to the change of course taken successively by Hamas, by perpetrating the crimes of October 7, and by the Israeli government, by persisting in a war that has become criminal. The destruction of Gaza, the growing colonization of the West Bank, and the obstinacy of Israeli policy in a reprehensible headlong rush, compel the international community to commit itself, not only to ending the war and ensuring that the hardline terrorist regime in Gaza lays down its arms and releases the hostages, but also to establishing a new configuration in which the conflict can be dealt with differently on all fronts.
It is in this context that the option of recognizing the Palestinian state is considered the most relevant, because it is the most radical. It is radical in that it states that a state exists, currently under fire and oppression from another state. It is justified by its rejection of the statements made by right-wing and far-right Israeli politicians who claim that there will never be a Palestinian state. But to really change the situation in the ongoing conflict, it needs more than what it proclaims. Verbally radical, it still needs to be adjusted to the facts.
There remains a gaping chasm between the constraints of reality and the stated goal. What is recognized exists only because it is declared, and what is declared is anything but within reach.
For the other desired outcome to truly result from the gesture, certain conditions are required, and these conditions are uncertain. It is clear that force is necessary in the current situation. And if the main desired effect, namely an end to the fighting and atrocities currently taking place, were to be achieved without fail, that would be enough to justify the gesture without the slightest hesitation. But we know that, as things stand, this is not the case. The argument of pressure on the current Israeli government falls short as long as this pressure remains more symbolic than real and does not achieve its specific goal, namely to effectively hinder its military action. However, this action cannot erode the support it enjoys among Israeli and, more generally, Jewish public opinion unless other pressure is simultaneously exerted on the Palestinian forces, which remain determined to destroy the Jewish state. Without this symmetry in the international response, there remains a risk of reinforcing Israel’s “Spartan” isolation, and thus its indefinite state of war, as proclaimed by its leader. If we want to move effectively towards the desired new configuration, it is impossible to ignore the shifts in Israeli public opinion. However, even the most progressive and pro-two-state solution elements of Israeli public opinion currently view the effectiveness of achieving recognition of the Palestinian state with the utmost skepticism, and cannot help but point out that by aiming for peace with such a fragile implementation, it is always possible that what will actually happen is a new cycle of violence.
Under these circumstances, in response to the words spoken by Emmanuel Macron on September 22 at the UN, we find ourselves—and, why not acknowledge it, even within the editorial staff of K. fundamental differences of opinion are expressed—oscillating between wishful thinking and hope, unable to settle on one or the other. Hope is obviously what the speaker wants to see and show: “The time has come…”. But we fear that this is nothing more than wishful thinking. The hope is stronger than the wish because it aims at something perceived as achievable in the near future, provided that we want it. Desire is weaker, not because it is less strong, but because it knows that it can only evoke its object in the abstract, considering that it depends on so many conditions that its feasibility is as if suspended.
In accordance with the July 29 New York declaration, a prelude to the act of recognition that has just taken place, the need for demilitarization, the return of hostages, the exclusion of Hamas, the transfer of power to the Palestinian Authority and the establishment of an international force to support it, the scheduling of free elections within one year of the new government taking office—in short, efforts are being made to come as close as possible to the conditions set by the UN in the acceptance of “peaceful states.” But for now, there remains a gaping chasm between the constraints imposed by reality (since a ceasefire is necessary without Hamas surrendering, which would therefore remain in power in Gaza) and the stated goal. What is recognized is only because it is declared, and what is declared is anything but within reach. In short, between wish and hope, the former inevitably takes precedence over the latter as soon as we look at things squarely. Whatever we may want, this is the limit of the action that has just been taken, even if we credit it with its stated intentions, and even if we share those intentions.
The editorial team
