Left-wing Zionism on trial

The contemporary anti-Zionist left has decided to reject the idea that one can be both Zionist and left-wing. Yet this possibility is clearly attested to by a whole section of Israel’s political history, as well as by the political movements to which many Jews in the diaspora adhere. Julien Chanet, drawing on sources and references found in Paris and Brussels, examines the causes and consequences of this “anti-Zionist truism” that insists that “left-wing Zionism” is an oxymoron. By choosing to denigrate this reality rather than consider it, anti-Zionism not only aims to make Jews a little more alien to the left, but paradoxically becomes the objective ally of reactionary Zionism, blocking any prospect of a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

 

 

In recent years, we have witnessed a grassroots movement involving Jews and non-Jews whose aims include combating antisemitism wherever it comes from. Collectives and journals, each with their own specificities, are attempting to curb the denial of antisemitism and its status as a non-issue^[1], and critically question the accusation of “instrumentalizing antisemitism.” This emergence, which has gained momentum since October 7, has led to a richer reflection, a freer expression, and the formation of collectives. It is thus contributing to the formation of a heterogeneous progressive force, which nevertheless remains fragile in the face of the platforms (media, editorial, associative, etc.) deployed, on the one hand by right-wing, reactionary, conservative, and illiberal forces, and on the other by a so-called radical, decolonial, and anti-Zionist left. Ilan Greislammer aptly describes this predicament of being “day and night between a rock and a hard place—the rock of Zionism’s good conscience, visceral and triumphant, for whom everything the State of Israel or one of its organs does is necessarily perfect, wonderful, even magical; and the hard place of visceral anti-Israelism that today holds sway in many countries around the world.“^[2]

Two remarks are necessary for a proper understanding of these distinctions. First, the emerging “third way” fighting against antisemitism includes, but is not limited to, the “left-wing Zionists” that we will discuss in this article. This expression is rarely used by the group to define itself, but is rather a pejorative label. We will attempt to understand why. Secondly, it is important to note that certain sectors of this so-called radical, anti-Zionist, and decolonial left regularly perpetuate and propagate reactionary, conservative, and illiberal views. The ideological lines are therefore blurred when it comes to left-right labels, especially when Jews or Israel are mentioned. It is not a question of giving carte blanche to “the left”—meaning versatile—but of understanding what underpins the polemical criticism surrounding the term “left-wing Zionist.”

The accusation of “left-wing Zionism” aims to tarnish the credibility of those who are concerned about antisemitism on the left, and thus discredits the very object of their concern.

Among the most controversial and divisive elements is the well-argued reminder of the existence of “antisemitism of/by/on the left” (which does not replace the ongoing fight against conservative, illiberal, and reactionary antisemitic discourse). What should alarm any serious antiracist, however, has led to a major backlash, consisting of counterattacks and diversions. A certain offended left, aided by “innocent Jews,” ranging from French decolonialists to the French far-left political party La France Insoumise and beyond, far from recanting, is seeking to strengthen itself internally (through audiovisual productions, publishing houses, magazines, etc.) and externally (social media, books, etc.), notably by intensifying a trench war. The responses stipulate that one cannot be left-wing and antisemitic. A phrase circulating in La France Insoumise sums up this proclaimed inability: “being antisemitic is not within our means.”

The now well-known term “instrumentalization” of antisemitism is increasingly associated with the expression “left-wing Zionist” in an effort to discredit individuals and groups. Used as a way of turning the tables or responding in kind, this accusation of “left-wing Zionism” aims to tarnish the credibility of those who are concerned about antisemitism on the left and, in doing so, discredits the very object of their concern. The expression has two targets: Zionists who claim to be left-wing, and those who claim to be left-wing without rejecting Zionism. It is understood that Zionism and the left are seen as antinomies. Worse still, it is an intellectual scam, all to the benefit of far-right Israeli propaganda, either by useful idiots or by manipulators. The goal of anti-Zionists is to denounce a ruse used by “Zionists” that allows them to advance under cover and propagate with a clear conscience racist (Islamophobic, anti-Palestinian) and even antisemitic discourse. In short, there is no left except the anti-Zionist left. In reality, “left-wing Zionism” in Paris, London, or Brussels appears to be a term used to unite the “warriors of Israel’s delegitimization” against the “blissful pacifists” (Eyal Sivan). ^[3]. For our part, we choose to be “Warriors for Peace.”^[4]. In fact, the debate is not new and concerns, in the words of Ilan Greilsammer, “intellectuals who support the existence and security of the State of Israel, while being continually very uncomfortable with the actions and policies of that state. In other words, those who are commonly referred to as “left-wing Zionists,” “doves,” or “the peace camp.”^[5]

The guilt of Zionism?

Let us set this question aside before moving forward, even though it is the subject of entire libraries. Historical Zionism reopens the possibilities of a Jewish singularity finding its way back to the universal through the opportunity offered to the Jewish people to extricate themselves from exogenous historical “situations” (injustice, pogroms, genocide, etc.). It was by appreciating the historical conditions of survival in order to escape a “shameful existence” (Pinsker) that Zionism first emerged as an idea and then as a political proposal, alongside revolutionary aspirations in the East and integrationist aspirations in the West. Herzl’s optimism and his idealized and irenic vision—which echoed the colonialism of the late 19th century—had to contend with the harsh realities of external and internal opposition to Judaism, whether conservative, progressive, socialist, anarchist, or federalist (the kibbutz movement), a process that would shape the galaxy of Zionisms: “evolution confirmed the victory of rationality over romantic exaltation, of a progressive vision over a thirst for the absolute, of maturity over the childishness characteristic of the spirit of youth movements, which soon gave way to political organizations.”^[6]

Therefore, the trial of “Zionism,” constructed as a particular form of national liberation—and suffering from pathologies similar to other cases of liberation^[7] — cannot be understood without taking into account the lines of force running through not so much “Zionism” as those who inhabit its realization. The liberationists, as Walzer calls them, and the populations joining them, reopen a field of possibilities, and it is in this space that politics is reproduced: the regaining of control over a collective destiny as well as the internal conflicts linked to the way in which this destiny is conducted. The “autonomous state existence” they have achieved cannot therefore be conceived as the victory of totality over diversity, as the history of Zionism is there to convince us of the intellectual breeding ground it represents. ^[8] — even if the politics of recent years have greatly weakened this edifice, as we shall return to later. “Left-wing Zionism” is therefore a political option that indicates a direction, a philosophy: it is a political tradition that is primarily rooted in this national liberation movement. “Left-wing Zionism” is therefore only really relevant when applied to the Israeli political landscape, and can be used to describe, for example, the Meretz party, or even the Labor Party, which differ from the specific political divisions of the anti-Zionist or asionist parties in Israel, often of a communist persuasion (such as Matzpen). The “post-Zionist” continuation (after the establishment of the State of Israel) of “left-wing Zionism,” in the sense that the state exists but in a form that is unsatisfactory to itself and its neighbors (Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians), is an indication of the plural and protean nature of Zionism, which cultivates divisions within itself. It is understandable that, when applied to Western Europe, this expression requires specific analysis.

Anti-Zionism as convention

Nevertheless, the first difficulty encountered when examining this subject is not so much the definitions of the terms used by different people as the irrefutable link between anti-Zionism and contemporary forms of the “radical” left. In other words, we must recognize how self-evident the notion of anti-Zionism is in the common understanding of this left. Admittedly, it is the vagueness surrounding the definition of terms that contributes to its consensual nature, but it is also the routine nature of the habitus that allows this self-evidence to be sanctified. By coalescing not as a source of reflection but as an unquestioned assumption, anti-Zionism becomes a convention. Only then is a definition provided, based on elements of justification: Zionism is racism, supremacism, etc. This allows the radical left to blur the lines between pre-state Jewish anti-Zionism, diasporism, Jewish socialism, and any anti-Israel sentiment unrelated to the Middle East. This makes it possible to reduce the opposition between the reactionary camp and the progressive vanguard to a conflict between pro-Zionists and anti-Zionists, which, in some cases, allows for a coalition of convenience between the radical left and Islamo-conservative fringes.

By forming a coalition not as a source of reflection but as an unquestioned assumption, anti-Zionism becomes a convention. And only then is the definition given, based on elements of justification: Zionism is racism, supremacism, etc.

When we look at the iterations of anti-Zionist discourse, we notice that the conceptual vagueness surrounding it is reflected in all current affairs and reshapes political priorities: class struggle—to take a category that was once all-encompassing—is now overshadowed by the issue of Zionism, Israel, and Palestine; and the same is true for political ecology, Russia’s war in Ukraine, anti-prison activism, and LGBT struggles. And while some “anti-Zionist” arguments are crude—the slogan “the proof is in Palestine” symbolizing an obsessive form—and unrelated to any criticism of the actions of Israeli governments, they resonate with a certain audience. These discourses provide spaces for politicization for many people, young and old, from all social classes. This dynamic is reminiscent of the popularity of Dieudonné, but in a more directly political dimension and, in a sense, in search of greater respectability. Dieudonné “did not only attract an audience from disadvantaged backgrounds,” , recalled trade unionist and historian Robert Hirsch, “but also executives, no doubt seduced by the irreverent side of the character and his way of tackling taboo subjects such as the genocide of the Jews.”^[9] While the search for “anti-system” spaces by a section of the small university, associative, and tertiary bureaucracy remains relevant today, it has always been accompanied by a search for legitimacy. This explains, for example, the cherry-picking in international law to justify “armed resistance” in the face of oppression; and, more generally, the tendency to accredit anything that confirms their bias (which is not unique to them, but is instead widely shared in all militant circles). Contemporary anti-Zionism therefore forms a composite space of struggle, oscillating between quotes from commentators and editorialists on a Twitch channel (such as Paroles d’Honneur) or YouTube columnists of very uneven quality, and selected quotes from academics (or selected academics), all without critical distance or discernment. The various echo chambers that are cultural and media spaces perpetuate “anti-Zionist evidence” and legitimize the associated theses, even when they propagate openly antisemitic anti-Zionism.

The political struggle embodied by the emerging “third way,” which combats antisemitism wherever it comes from, must guide us, both in its directly political and educational approach. As Jonas Pardo and Samuel Delor explain^[10], a distinction must be made between the “producers” of antisemitism (the “opinion leaders”) and the “reproducers” (here, what we have called the “sounding boards”). The same applies to the analysis of anti-Zionism, which more or less overlaps with these spaces, but also goes beyond them.

USSR, UN, Durban: Zionism is racism

It is understandable that Zionism is less contested for what it is (a political doctrine with many variations) than as a projection surface onto which the militant virtue of its fierce opponents is refracted.^[11].

Nowhere is this more apparent than in that branch of contemporary anti-Zionism which, linked to anti-imperialism or truncated anti-capitalism, is largely based on the equivalence between racism and Zionism. This equation finds its culmination at the level of international institutions in Resolution 3379, passed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1975. This resolution, which was preceded by numerous international conferences on the subject and supported by a series of increasingly radical amendments by the USSR, “considers Zionism to be a form of racism and racial discrimination.” What are we to make of this? First and foremost, that in international forums, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is primarily treated and exploited for the benefit of internal and inter-country geopolitical issues. The Zionist-Leninist interlude that began in 1947 and ended in 1949 with the closure of the USSR was aimed at stirring up contradictions within the imperialist-capitalist camp in order to regain a foothold in the region. Since 1914, following the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Moscow had had no official presence in Palestine since 1914 — and to divide the imperialist powers, targeting mainly Great Britain^[12] When this strategy failed—Israel making autonomous choices that did not suit the Kremlin’s line—Stalinist and post-Stalinist Russia began to seek ideological legitimacy for their “anti-Zionist campaigns.”^[13], which they could not find in the classic texts of Marxism or in Lenin<footnote>William Korey, ‘Les racines de l’antisémitisme et son développement en Union soviétique,’ 1972/ PHDN 2022.</footnote>. This ideological rationalization was found in the equation “Zionism = racism.” Resolution 3379 was the subject of much criticism and was revised by the General Assembly in 1991, but the seed had been planted too deeply.

Another key date in the success of the perpetuation of the Soviet doctrine of anti-Zionism was 2001, with the World Conference Against Racism organized by the United Nations in Durban, South Africa. It revived the equivalence between Zionism and racism and established the link between the State of Israel and the apartheid regime. According to David Hirsh, an English sociologist and tireless analyst of left-wing antisemitism, in Durban “the parts of the left that were particularly vulnerable to anti-Zionism had significant commonalities and points of contact with groups that defined themselves by [their] interpretations of Islam in the twentieth century.” ^[14] — radical political interpretations of Islamic texts and symbols.

But the convergence is articulated by the Soviet perspective on anti-Zionism, regularly supported by pseudo-exegesis of Jewish texts — in reality, crude anti-Judaism poorly masking fundamental antisemitism. Hirsh thus recalls the perpetuation of the refrain about the “Chosen People,” quoting a 1975 article published in the USSR: “Israeli aggression, which keeps the entire Middle East and the whole world in a state of tension, has for years been ‘underpinned’ by Zionist ideology. Zionism has taken to extremes the Jewish claim that the Jewish people are ‘chosen by God’, ‘exclusive’ and superior to other peoples.” In other words, ”anti-Zionism posits that everything bad in the world is caused by Zionism and that the evil of Zionism is the direct result of the essential evil of Judaism […]. Durban’s anti-Zionism is a worldview that makes Israel the keystone of a global, interconnected, and coherent system of oppression.”^[15] As is to be expected in such a place, diplomacy led to the final text being heavily watered down and softened; this is why commentators such as Joëlle Fiss in her Durban Diaries focus much more on the sidelines of the Conference, while Hirsh and Miller take Durban as an object that ”tells us nothing about Jews or Israel but plenty about the particular society in which people pick up old bits and pieces of discarded antisemitism and use them to build their own way of dealing with what they find unbearable. Antisemitism, and antizionism too, are not only effects of “society,” they are ideologies which specific human beings construct and use for their own purposes.”^[16]

Being Israeli (or Zionist) in France would therefore make you a moving target. And when you become a target, you hide, you keep quiet, you make yourself small and discreet, and you give up your political power. To fully regain your innocence, you have to return to the ghetto and fight against Israel’s right to exist.

Despite the work accomplished and the knowledge produced, tackling antisemitism wherever it comes from means challenging the left on the issue of anti-Zionism as a worldview, which remains a particularly complex undertaking and requires appeasing and overcoming certain tensions. Indeed, very often swept under the carpet so as not to fracture the fight against antisemitism, the question of Zionism is left to the right and to anti-Zionists, with the consequence of reducing the scope of our criticism to the antisemitic expressions of anti-Zionism (when the latter is explicitly a pretext for antisemitism). This does not mean blindly defending Zionism—which must be open to criticism, just as the individual freedom to adhere to it or not must be respected—but rather avoiding a situation where the only basis for criticism is “allowing anti-antisemitism to express its rejection of a Judaism that included Zionism.” ^[17]

Left-wing Zionists, or political commentators more generally, thus often find themselves in the position of mobilizing history, for example the Stalinist policy of nationalities in the USSR, to explain that the use of the term “Zionist”^[18] comes to cover that of “Jew.” But in doing so, discrimination against “Zionists” is left out. Thus, numerous instances—sometimes unconscious—convey a legitimacy in helping Jews while justifying attacks on “Zionists.” An example can be found in a podcast that mentions the beating of an elderly Jewish man “in the name of Palestine.” The presenter speaks up to say, “It’s antisemitic, because he was identified as Jewish and not necessarily as a Zionist, or as a…” Repeatedly, we see that La France Insoumise is at pains not to confuse Zionists with Jews—which is a consensual position. But why? MP Ersilia Soudais lets the cat out of the bag: “We do not thank those who contribute to conflating ‘Jews’ and ‘Israelis’, helping to put a target on the backs of our Jewish fellow citizens” (X, August 9, 2024). Being Israeli (or Zionist) in France would therefore make you a moving target. And when you become a target, you hide, you keep quiet, you make yourself small and discreet, and you give up your political power. To fully regain your innocence, you have to return to the ghetto and fight against Israel’s right to exist.

The question of Zionism is left to the right and to anti-Zionists, with the result that the scope of our criticism is reduced to the antisemitic expressions of anti-Zionism.

Do we want to live in a world that justifies hunting down Zionists? It is not enough to point out that the links between Zionism and Jewishness are obvious (without, however, reducing one to the other). We must affirm that this legitimization of physical violence (even when deploring it) is an illiberal political option in the extreme and harks back, for example, to the neoconservative anti-communist witch hunt during the Cold War, even though Stalinism and state communism were absolutely detestable. This reactionary witch hunt did not prevent part of the revolutionary left from continuing the struggle against Stalinism while maintaining the goal of emancipation. Why, then, should it be unthinkable that left-wing Zionism, while not supported in its internal criticism of Zionism when it veers toward the right, the far right, and fascism, should at least be left alone?

If this is not the case, it is because left-wing Zionism represents a way out, and therefore a moral and existential hope for Israel. Unlike Netanyahu’s Zionism, which, because it is indeed catastrophic, seems to validate the deep conviction of anti-Zionism (the intrinsically genocidal character of the State of Israel and Zionism), “left-wing Zionism” comes to play the spoiler.

Left-wing Zionism as a Trojan horse

To give substance to our arguments, we could focus on the most popular vectors of this confusion^[19], in order to understand how this ecosystem works in relation to our subject. Here, we have chosen to focus on anti-Zionist gray literature that lies halfway between the academic and activist worlds: a less crude and caricatural corpus, but one that nonetheless puts forward theoretical propositions and explanations that are debatable, if not contestable.

Let’s start with a book published by Éditions de la Découverte, L’échec d’une utopie. L’histoire des gauches en Israël (The Failure of a Utopia: The History of the Left in Israel) (2021) by Thomas Vescovi, a committed author and recent PhD graduate in political science on these issues, who appears keen to deliver a rigorous historical account. We refer readers to the reviews of his book for an overview, while we will focus mainly on a strikingly concise paragraph in the introduction, in which he sets out his view of Zionism as intrinsically Jewish, and where he contrasts social condition with the condition of belonging. Let us listen to this astonishing ode to assimilationist universalism backed by class reductionism from a supporter of the decolonial left:

“Nationalist perspectives, a fortiori ethno-religious ones in the case of Zionism, are equated with a break with the class struggle that is supposed to unite individuals through their social condition and not their community. […] Being left-wing can refer to a universalist approach, namely defending principles such as social justice for all or access to equality and freedom for all peoples. Zionism seems to contradict these ideals, as it seeks to defend only Jews.”

On closer reading, Vescovi’s argument is based on a mistaken view of Zionism as it actually developed, which was not exclusively “ethno-religious” but essentially secular, while making a pragmatic compromise aimed at creating a home for very heterogeneous populations. The question of statehood only arose at the very end of the process. In fact, far from being reduced to an ethno-religious and messianic mystique, Zionism as it has been realized can be seen not as the end of exile, but as its modern and paradoxical updating, via the nation-state, in a kind of static exile.<footenote>Danny Trom, Une théorie politique de la survie, Paris, EHESS/Gallimard/Seuil, 2018.</footnote>. Worse, Vescovi sees Zionism as a closed ethno-religious particularism, therefore a framework of thought ontologically incompatible with a definition of the left conveniently produced by Vescovi. Therefore, “the Israeli left must choose: Zionism or the left,”^[20] he explains. This is what Maxime Benatouil (a member of Tsedek!) summed up a little later, referring to a few organizations pejoratively described as “left-wing Zionists”: “Basically, before being left-wing, they are Zionists.” ^[21]

For Vescovi & co, there can be no such thing as “left-wing Zionism”; he is only willing to admit that there are Zionists who claim to be left-wing (“some may have believed it”) and left-wing people who claim to be Zionists (which would be a contradiction in terms).

To support this, one must adopt a reductive conception of Zionism as essentially reactionary, as espoused by the Franco-Lebanese international relations researcher Gilbert Achcar in an article in Le Monde Diplomatique: “While most of the national ideologies that emerged in Europe during the first half of the 19th century or in colonized countries in the following century were based on emancipatory and democratic thinking, modern Zionist ideology is more akin to the fanatical and colonialist nationalism that was in vogue at the time of its birth. […] Admittedly, state Zionism was undeniably formed in reaction to the oppression of the Jews: Herzl himself explains in the preface to his book that “the distress of the Jews” is the “driving force” behind the movement he wishes to create. It is equally undeniable, however, that Zionism as he theorized it is an ideology based on an essentially reactionary and colonialist logic.”^[22].

Once this conception becomes mainstream, the one that corresponds to left-wing Zionism and allows for internal criticism of the reactionary tendencies of Zionism is doomed to become a minority view in the “progressive” sphere. The French-Israeli journalist Charles Enderlin, also a regular contributor to Le Monde Diplomatique, recalls what this conception, centered on the secular and democratic ambition of historical Zionism, is based on: “I consider myself a Zionist insofar as there must be a Jewish state at peace with its neighbors, where, according to the definition of a certain Theodor Herzl, ‘the generals will remain in their barracks and the rabbis in their synagogues.’ The problem today is that both are outside the barracks and synagogues. I dream that one day there will be a real state of this kind, as defined by the founder of political Zionism! You must read it! You must read Theodor Herzl’s book where he criticizes messianism, where there is an election—and the extremist rabbi loses the election. A country where the president is Jewish, the vice president is Arab, they get along, and they do things together, yes.”

Between these two conceptions, Vescovi, like the entire anti-Zionist movement denouncing the bogeyman of “left-wing Zionism,” has made his choice. Following in the footsteps of Achcar but also of Enzo Traverso^[23], for whom “Israel has become an outpost of the West within the Arab world,” he specifies that the goal of Zionism was not only a nationalist achievement, but from the outset aimed to “anchor itself in the capitalist, Western, democratic, American camp.”^[24], and we can see from his writing that, if this is true, Zionism is ontologically flawed. The “democratic camp” will appreciate this. In a recent article, he drives the point home: Zionism is “a colonial and ethnic movement, and therefore racist and ethnicist.” In a recent article, he drives the point home: Zionism is “a colonial and ethnic movement, and therefore racist and ethnicist.” Consequently, for Vescovi & co, there can be no “left-wing Zionism,” although he is willing to admit that there are Zionists who claim to be left-wing (“some may have believed it”) and left-wingers who claim to be Zionists (which would be a contradiction in terms).

This is where the “heads I win, tails you lose” trick comes in: while his book begins by criticizing the ethno-religious nature of Zionism, which defends “only Jews,” and by advocating left-wing universalism, Vescovi quickly returns to the most classic anti-Zionist narrative: “Israel, the outpost of the West in the Arab world.” This is where the crux of the matter lies: Zionism has privileged Jewish identity, so Jews must be separated from Zionists in order to free them from their oppressive, imperial, democratic, capitalist, ‘Western’ shell. We know the song.

It is the existence and maintenance of the State of Israel that poses a problem for the anti-Zionist detractors of “left-wing Zionism,” and not so much the way in which this state is run.

By reducing the Zionist question to, on the one hand, an identity issue that has neglected social issues and, on the other, a “capitalist, Western, democratic, American,” “ethnic and colonial” vehicle, Thomas Vescovi and many others believe themselves to be the successors of Zeev Sternell, the “new historian” whose writings highlight the blind spots of the Israeli national narrative, including on the progressive side. For this respected and controversial historian, statism took precedence over the construction of socialism. While the socialist construction of the state was the goal of the ruling party, at least ideologically, Ben-Gurion’s labor-oriented Mapai party had to adopt a pragmatic view and revise its platform in favor of national consolidation (with bourgeois institutions allied with the state form of the nation). For Sternhell, “the priority given to the nation has enabled Israel, on at least four occasions, to triumph over its neighbors who denied even its right to exist, but the social price has been very high.” Perhaps the proposition should be reversed: “The priority given to the nation stems from the fact that Israel was threatened at least four times by its neighbors who denied its very right to exist. The social price has been very high.” ^[25]. In any case, while the Labor Party did not establish socialism or peace with the Palestinians, it rose to the challenge of not only building a state, but also maintaining it. This is, in essence, what troubles the anti-Zionist detractors of “left-wing Zionism,” rather than how the state is run.

Although he was a fierce critic of Israel’s political direction, viewing Zionism as both a historical phenomenon and a subject of controversy, Sternhell was nonetheless committed to the state’s survival. In an interview given in 1998, he expressed his doubts and anger, but also his convictions, rooted in the left: “I have never had any doubts about the legitimacy of Zionism. I believe that Zionism is fundamentally just, justified and legitimized by the existential need of the Jews to find a piece of land for themselves. But this vision also marks the limits of Zionism. This means that once the goal has been achieved, once a state where Jews are at home has been established, that is where the process of conquest ends. […] Zionism is a form of nationalism and, like all forms of nationalism, it suffers from all the weaknesses of nationalism.” Let us add, to echo Vescovi, that for Sternhell, “nationalism […] is generally not conducive to universal values.” But everything is a matter of nuance, and Sternhell knows it: “As far as I am concerned, I refuse to abolish the Law of Return, at least in the present. I refuse to liquidate what remains Israel’s primary raison d’être, which is to allow Jews to come when they want […] But as long as the Law of Return exists, a body of legislation must be created around it that ensures equal rights for all those who are not Jewish […] ^[26].” Fighting ‘left-wing Zionism’ means fighting such visions and perspectives, which are the result of rich and complex thinking.

Anti-Zionism on the Israeli far right

Thus, before October 7, Netanyahu’s rabid illiberalism was rolling back all the gains of Zionism. It has since sunk into a war of destruction which, far from restoring the security necessary for regional stability, is bringing Gaza to the brink of annihilation and opening Palestine up to an unprecedented level of dismemberment and the prospect of total annexation, while plunging Israel into an existential abyss. Left-wing Zionism, which should be revitalized in order to confront this reactionary and fascistic steamroller, is therefore being mocked by “radical left-wing activists” in Paris, London, and Brussels, when they should, at least on paper, be demonstrating their universal commitment to “social justice for all, and access to equality and freedom for all peoples.” But this minority of “left-wing Zionists” is challenged on all fronts: both on the content of its ideas and, in an obvious paradox, on its ability to shift the political lines in a power struggle. In one case, it is denigrated for what it is; in the other, its left-wing roots are acknowledged, but it is dismissed for its weakness. As Michel Warschawski, an anti-Zionist activist (and author of the preface to Thomas Vescovi’s book), puts it: “Consider this fact: the peaceful and progressive Israeli Jewish society is now only a minority of citizens.”^[27]. There is therefore nothing to save. But, in an apparent paradox, it is nevertheless towards this minority that the attacks of European anti-Zionists—themselves a political minority, both in the diaspora and in Israel—are directed. Case closed.

*

It is time to conclude. What is the assessment of this “radical anti-Zionist and decolonial left” on the Israeli left, in the broad sense? It is simple: “left-wing Zionism” is contradictory to left-wing values, Zionism being either an ethno-racial identity that has not opened itself up to the universal, or an irredeemable heir to colonization and imperialism, in direct contradiction to the intrinsic universalism of the left. Progressive minorities are inconsistent because of their attachment to Zionism, since it is the reactionary majority that sets the tone. Therefore, when left-wing Zionism fights the far right, anti-Zionism joins the latter to discredit the minority of left-wing Zionists.

Left-wing Zionism represents a way out, and therefore a moral and existential hope for Israel.

Indeed, Vescovi believes he is justified in targeting the progressive minority because, “from the Labor Party to the Israeli communists, including those activist circles that advocate for a society of equality and justice, as well as NGOs that defend the rights and freedom of Palestinians […] [the organs of the Israeli left] are the heirs of a history that dates back to the establishment of the Zionist movement in Palestine.” In other words, left-wing minorities, even communists, are above all the product of Zionism. Blind to historical complexity and political divisions, in his writing and speeches, Zionism becomes a totalizing political identity, a genealogical source that taints everything that has emerged in Israel. Progressive minorities are therefore suspect and, to put it bluntly, corrupt.

And not just progressive minorities, in reality. In a damning text written in 2017 against Israeli director Amos Gitaï, described as a left-wing Zionist—which makes sense from an Israeli point of view—Vescovi interprets attempts at dialogue as ploys to legitimize Israel’s Jewish perseverance, a persistence that is all the more disturbing because it is based “on the return of Jews to politics” (Karsenti): “On several occasions, Amos Gitaï has engaged in dialogue with members of Israeli Jewish society, and their eloquent speeches argue for the establishment of a Palestinian state. To what end? The director may be left-wing, but he is nonetheless a Zionist: the ultimate goal is and remains the defense of a society based on Jewish privilege.”^[28]. Advocating for the establishment of a Palestinian state leads to accusations of defending a state for Jews, which is distorted into a sinister “Jewish privilege.” It is easier to understand the fears felt when the idea of a shared state “from the sea to the Jordan” is put forward by anti-Zionist activists, as it is so far removed from the defense of “egalitarian freedom” (Balibar) necessary for Israeli-Palestinian co-citizenship. The fact is that they are much more anti-Zionist than pro-Palestinian. Against the advice of all these sad sacks who devote their energy to fighting against the normalization of Israel’s existence, let us continue to join and support progressive movements in Israel, Palestine, and among Israelis and Palestinians.

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Julien Chanet