Germany’s Battle Against Antisemitism. Part 1: State Power, Social Resistance, and the Fight for Justice

Continuing our investigation into the state of antisemitism across Europe, in partnership with DILCRAH, Monty Ott examines Germany’s ongoing battle against antisemitism, blending historical context with urgent contemporary issues. Using Adorno’s philosophy as a framework, Ott explores the role of state power in countering rising antisemitic violence, especially in the wake of Hamas’ October 2023 attacks. He tackles the complexities of this fight, from political controversies to social resistance, raising critical questions about Germany’s responsibility. It begs the question – can state action, civil society, or a combination of both truly confront the deep-rooted issue of antisemitism?

The fight against antisemitism as a task of state action

“These people, who in principle prefer to appeal to authority themselves and whose belief in authority is difficult to shake, must not be allowed to renounce authority. Where they seriously venture into antisemitic manifestations, the actual means of power at their disposal must be used without sentimentality, not out of a need for punishment or to take revenge on these people, but to show them that the only thing that impresses them, namely real social authority, is still against them for the time being. The arguments that one puts forward to them must also be designed from the outset in such a way that they can reach people who have such a character structure, without departing from the truth in any way.”^[1]

One could be forgiven for thinking that Theodor W. Adorno missed the point when, at the invitation of the Coordinating Council of the Societies for Christian-Jewish Cooperation at the First European Educators’ Conference in 1962, he urged those present to use “the actual means of power at their disposal without sentimentality”. Not only because the conference dealt with “prejudice” and Adorno quickly made it clear that antisemitism could not be labeled as such, but also because the above quote sounds little like a pedagogical measure. However, the philosopher pursued a kind of double strategy in combating what Jean-Paul Sartre had described in his reflections on the Jewish question as a “passion” and a “comprehensive attitude […] towards people in general, history and society”: Antisemitism.^[2] Adorno illustrates this ‘double strategy’ with an anecdote about a group of chauffeurs in the service of the US military. Adorno heard them making antisemitic remarks and had them arrested without further ado. However, he did not leave it at that, but drove with the detainees to the police station and, once there, continued the discussion with them and gave a counter-argument.^[3]

There are good reasons why the Suhrkamp publishing house has republished this lecture, which originally appeared in a rather hidden anthology, after October 7, 2023. This date has once again brought the threatening presence of antisemitic violence to the attention of many people. It is not just about the cruel massacres and systematic sexualized violence perpetrated by the Palestinian Islamist terrorist organization Hamas in Israel. It is about the “genocidal message”^[4] that Jews around the world have heard. When Hamas called for a “Day of Rage”^[5], it openly issued an eliminatory threat against the Jewish state and Jewish communities. However, it did not take this call for people in Germany to show solidarity with Hamas’ terror. Positive references and relativizations could already be read on social networks on October 8, while the gruesome Hamas massacres were still taking place. While the terrorists were still murdering and mutilating civilians in southern Israel, artists in Germany were posting “Free Palestine” and “From the River to the See” or cynically saying that people dancing in the vicinity of an “open-air prison” or “concentration camp” deserved no less. Samidoun members, who are regarded as the front organization of the Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine” (PFLP for short), even took to the streets of Neukölln in Berlin, cheering and handing out sweets. This all happened well before the Israeli army launched its counter-offensive with the aim of freeing the hostages and destroying Hamas – well before, according to the Hamas Ministry of Health, more than 44,000 people had died as a result of the military operation.

All of the open violence against Jews since the Hamas terrorist attack has been made possible by a social climate in which the danger of antisemitism has been relativized or even negated for years.

The positive references to Hamas terror and the threat of a “Day of Rage” aimed directly at Jews in Germany prompted people to gather for vigils at synagogues on Shabbat on October 13 and to stand protectively in front of Jews who wanted to visit the congregation to pray.^[6]

But October 7, 2023 and everything that followed only made what had been apparent for years even more visible: antisemitism is becoming increasingly open and violent. All of the open violence against Jews since the Hamas terrorist attack has been made possible by a social climate in which the danger of antisemitism has been relativized or even negated for years. It was made possible by a social climate in which antisemitism was instrumentalized in public debates – for example in party political competition or for tightening asylum and migration policies. In the years since 9 October 2019, the right-wing terrorist attack on the synagogue and the KiezDöner in Halle (Saale), what linguist Monika Schwarz-Friesel emphasized in 2020 has been confirmed: “Anti-Jewish ideas always came from the center, from the writings of scholars and educated people, before they reached the streets.”^[7]

This development must be understood against the background of the fact that German history was and still is characterized by antisemitic violence even after 1945. Antisemitic ways of thinking and stereotypes by no means disappeared after the military defeat of the Nazis, and acts of anti-Jewish violence, including terrorism and murder, did not end either.^[8]

Nevertheless, the question can be asked: Is it the task of the German state to combat antisemitism? Or should it be the responsibility of civil society in particular? Is it even an interplay between the two sides?

Criticism and challenges

When political decision-makers talk about seeing antisemitism as a state task, this is not only met with applause. Criticism is also voiced by very different actors. From actors who believe that antisemitism is no longer a current problem and from actors who critically question the motivation. Reference is often made to the speech that former German Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) gave in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, in 2008.^[9] In this speech, she said that “Germany’s historical responsibility […] is part of my country’s “Staatsräson” (“reason of state”). This means that Israel’s security is never negotiable for me as German Chancellor”. This affirmation of the German-Israeli relationship with specific reference to German responsibility for the Shoah was criticized for drawing the wrong conclusions from German history: An unreflective solidarity with Israel would emerge, blurring the boundaries between political criticism and antisemitism and diluting the understanding of the latter. This would only benefit the right-wing government in Israel, which uses the “accusation of antisemitism” as a strategy of immunization. The state’s fight against Israel-related antisemitism thus becomes the subject of a number of controversies. This is followed by the accusation that the state’s fight against antisemitism is primarily externalized. This is mainly directed against racialized people in order to distract from the fact that antisemitism is primarily a right-wing phenomenon. This results in excessive restrictions on freedom of expression and artistic freedom. Germany is trying to buy its way out of its historical guilt with this exaggerated fight against antisemitism from the left or among Muslims and is ignoring the antisemitism of the majority population. It was also questioned what concrete measures would result from this “reason of state”. Is it an abstract positioning, or does it also result in military security? And what consequences does it have for domestic policy?

All of these debates take place in a complicated field. They overlap historical continuities of the most diverse nature: post-colonial and post-Nazi, racist and antisemitic. They do not take place in a vacuum, but are connected to the many voids of the past – to the lack of confrontation with the crimes of colonial rule, Porajmos and Shoah. This cannot be fully clarified in the scope envisaged here. However, it must be clearly emphasized that both antisemitism and racism produce violent social realities. In this respect, the state’s fight against antisemitism faces the challenge of constantly critically questioning its own foundations and motivation, while at the same time asserting its necessity. Only in this way is it possible to protect oneself from instrumentalization. It is currently a fact that the fight against antisemitism is sometimes politically instrumentalized, but that antisemitism is also relativized, ignored and reproduced by anti-Zionist actors in particular.

Basically, it can be said that the state’s fight against antisemitism is an extremely young field of political activity. At least to the extent that it concerns concrete measures and politicians no longer talk abstractly about “education” and “dialog”, which are necessary to overcome “prejudices”.

In any case, it should be clear that there is no all-encompassing answer to the current antisemitic threat. There are many factors that pose challenges to combating antisemitism. For example, while the substance of antisemitism has remained the same over the centuries, it has developed multiple forms of expression (religious, racial, deflection of guilt, Israel-related, structural/crypto) and is often expressed in ciphers due to the realities of a post-Nazi society. Sartre noted that antisemites are well aware of social taboos:

“Do not think that the antisemites are […] deluding themselves. They know that their speeches are superficial and questionable; but they laugh about it, their opponent has the duty to use the words in a serious way, because he believes in the power of the word; they have the right to play. They even like to play with the discourse, for by giving ridiculous reasons they discredit the seriousness of their interlocutor; they are delightfully insincere, for their aim is not to convince by good arguments, but to intimidate or mislead.”^[10]

The state’s fight against antisemitism is dependent on a holistic strategy that addresses antisemitism in every sphere of society. It must be interlinked with civil society.

Antisemitic images and ways of thinking are also reproduced unintentionally to some extent today. This is also due to the fact that the influence of antisemitism on this society was taken to extremes under National Socialism. Even before that, however, antisemitism was normalized. At the same time, there is great resistance to being called antisemitic.

In principle, education and dialog are justified as part of an overall strategy against antisemitism. This is because they can reach those who do not have a closed antisemitic worldview. Basic knowledge about antisemitism can be imparted and thus the ability to act in confrontation with it can be practiced. However, this can only reach those who are still open to it.^[11] And it must also be taken into account that dialog formats – especially after October 7 – are often associated with great burdens for the Jewish participants.^[12]

In this respect, Adorno’s demand is right: the state’s fight against antisemitism is dependent on a holistic strategy that addresses antisemitism in every sphere of society. It must play a part in empowering people to deal with antisemitism. It must be interlinked with civil society. It must enable spaces in which the antisemitic ways of thinking and stereotypes contained in this culture can be reflected upon – without punishment.

It must use its means of power where the antisemitic threat poses a danger to the life and limb of Jews. As Adorno put it: not out of a “need for punishment” or to “take revenge”, but to “show that the only thing that impresses them, namely real social authority”, defends the foundations of democracy. This is by no means intended to argue in the sense of a “law-and-order” policy. Rather, it should be understood as a plea for the application of current law. For example, several legal experts in the German Bundestag, in particular Kati Lang and Ulrike Lembke, pointed out that, when it comes to wrongful convictions in relation to antisemitism, there is a lack of further training and knowledge transfer from academia.^[13] The point is that existing law^[14] already provides for sanctions against antisemitism. However, these are not exhausted because the police, public prosecutor’s offices and courts lack the necessary expertise to classify acts appropriately.

In fact, the task of combating antisemitism is already enshrined in the German constitution. Not explicitly – which is regrettable – but implicitly: the Basic Law was created in its entirety in 1949 as a “counter-draft to the totalitarianism of the National Socialist regime”, as the Federal Constitutional Court made clear in its Wunsiedel decision in 2009. To quote Adorno once again, it was written so that “Auschwitz would not be repeated, nothing similar would happen.”^[15] However, Samuel Salzborn, Berlin’s contact person on antisemitism, points out the problems that came with this:

“The constitution of the federal German constitutional and (criminal) legal system was still based on the assumption that antisemitism is generally part of a (post-)Nazi worldview, meaning that its carrier groups come largely from right-wing extremist contexts. This was and is not wrong: antisemitism is an integral part of the Nazi and right-wing extremist worldview, but it is also very clear that antisemitism is increasingly being communicated via ‘detours’: because antisemites believe(d) […] that there is a communicative ‘taboo’ on making public antisemitic statements, but also because the antisemitic projection surfaces have changed. The dominant forms in post-war history were the antisemitic defense of guilt and antisemitism directed against Israel, both of which were also formulated in far-right milieus – but also in numerous other contexts that are not far-right in their self-perception.”^[16]

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Monty Ott

Read part 2 of this report in next week’s issue of K.