Cohn-Bendit: “Israelis must be pro-Palestinian and Palestinians pro-Israeli”.

Following his op-ed piece with Raphaël Glucksmann in the columns of Le Monde, the K. editorial team wanted to give Daniel Cohn-Bendit the opportunity to expand on his resolutely critical stance towards the Israeli government and his support for recognition of a Palestinian state. In this interview, Julia Christ and Danny Trom ask him about his Judaism, his relationship with Zionism, how he perceives the pro-Palestinian movements and BDS, as well as Europe and populism…

 

 

Danny Trom : To begin with, can you tell us about your experience on October 7?

Daniel Cohn-Bendit : To understand my reaction to October 7, you have to put it in the context of a reflection on my Jewish identity that’s been going on for several years. Being a Jew without being Jewish, while being Jewish without being one. I made a film called Nous sommes tous des juifs allemands (We are all German Jews). I realized that you can’t escape history, and I can’t escape it. When I see that photo of the kid coming out of the ghetto with his hands raised, I tell myself it could have been me or my brother. So I’m in this story. So it was in this process of reflection begun a few years ago that October 7 arrived. And October 7 was proof that Hamas, the Islamists and Iran really do want to eliminate the Jews from Israel, to drive them out, to destroy Israel. I’ve never been a Zionist, but I’ve never been anti-Zionist. I’ve always defined myself as a-Zionist. I understand perfectly well that Jews feel that no one has protected them or will protect them, that they need a state to protect them.

But that’s not my perspective. Perhaps, a little arrogantly, I tell myself that I don’t want to live among a majority of Jews. But I understand those who defend this idea. Besides, my mother would have liked to go to Palestine in 1945, but my father didn’t want to. So, on October 7 and 8, I thought that it was terrible that those who had gone to Israel, who had gone there to be protected, had not been protected. Israel didn’t protect them. The whole basis of Zionism collapsed on October 7. And then, in this situation of sadness, but above all of dismay, I realize that, apart from the Jews, it hasn’t touched many people. I’m exaggerating just a little, but whether in Germany or France, the indifference was obvious. And don’t tell me that the 100,000-strong demonstration in Paris changed anything. The vast majority were Jews, mostly old people, and the young were nowhere to be seen. It was not a popular moment of solidarity. The post-October 7 period left Jews feeling isolated.

Then there was the rise of Hamas’s convoluted justifications for its massacres, in the tradition of anti-imperialism. Politically, I said to myself, it’s no different from when we supported the FLN (National Liberation Front [Algeria]) despite all its exactions, or the Viet Cong, and so on. It turns out that these liberation movements are also totalitarian movements. This in no way delegitimizes anti-imperialism or decolonization, but it does pose a problem… There’s something wrong with the acritical support and justification of these movements. I don’t know whether those who do this about the October 7 massacre are antisemitic. I don’t know. But in any case, they’re not interested in Jews. I can tell you that. So there was no movement of solidarity with the Jews after October 7. Of course, there were exceptions. But overall, there wasn’t much empathy for the Jews who were massacred, raped and so on.

On October 7 and 8, I thought how terrible it was that those who went to Israel, who went there to be protected, were not. The whole basis of Zionism collapsed on October 7.

Julia Christ : The Viet Cong and the FLN were anti-imperialist, anti-colonial movements…

DCB : Yes, but dictatorial.

JC : Yes, but is Hamas also an anti-colonial movement?

DCB : It’s a movement that is seen as a liberation movement for the Palestinians. The problem is not whether it’s anti-colonial or not. There is a legitimacy for Palestinians to have a state. Hamas sees itself as a Palestinian liberation army. And it is considered as such by the majority of those who support the Palestinians today. So the problem of colonization is secondary, because the State of Israel is not a colonial state, although the situation in the West Bank is indeed one of colonization.

JC : But it’s important to make that clear.

DCB :Yes, but, for me, it’s important to emphasize that this is a movement fighting for a Palestinian state.

JC : Hamas ?

DCB :Hamas, and the others, yes. At least, it claims to. And Hamas’s state model is Iran. In other words, if a Palestinian state were created today under the authority of Hamas or the jihadists, we’d have something similar to the Islamic Republic of Iran. And Israel, quite understandably, refuses to have Iran on its border. So this is no minor problem. That’s why all those who support the Palestinians today through Hamas understand nothing of the situation.

DT : I’d like to go back a little further, to the loneliness felt after October 7. From Europe, doesn’t this loneliness force us to take a fresh look at the Zionist project? Because, in principle, today’s Europe should be concerned about the rest of the Jews who still live there.

DCB :We have to be careful here. There is an anti-Jewish, antisemitic impulse in society, most of which comes from Muslims, with the far left supporting these impulses for various reasons. But it must be stressed that European states protect Jews. The best example for me is German society. I would argue that, despite all the movements to the contrary, the safest country in the world for Jews is Germany. Because it’s a state that, without hesitation, without ever doubting, resolutely protects the Jewish community.

DT : Some people refer to this as Staatsräson, and there’s been a lot of discussion about this in Germany. What do you think?

DCB : I think this “raison d’État” is badly formulated. I agree with the Germans when they say: “Our raison d’État is to be on the side of the Jews against antisemitism, to protect them all over the world and in Israel too”. But a raison d’État defined only in relation to Israel poses a problem: what do we do with it if the fascists take complete power in Israel? If, tomorrow, Netanyahu, along with Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, decided to drive the Palestinians back to Jordan, or expel the two million Gazans, what would this Staatsräson dictate to us? We’d be stuck.

DT : As I understand it, Germany’s raison d’état is to defend the existence of the State of Israel.

DCB :Yes, but as soon as the State of Israel puts itself in danger?

DT : Germany has been known to criticize Israel all the same.

DCB : Yes, but it’s very difficult for Germany to criticize Israel. I remember a discussion with my friend, Joschka Fischer^[1], who was then the German Foreign Minister. I said to him: “You can’t go on like this. You have to find a way to criticize the settlements in the West Bank. We can’t accept that, because there’s international law, the two-state perspective, the UN, and if we don’t fight for the law, we’re not credible”. He replied: “Dany, I understand. I’m going to go and see my friend Ariel Sharon, and I’m going to tell him that it’s not going to work like that, really not. And you know what Ariel’s going to say to me? He’s going to ask me ‘Joschka, where are you from? Ah, Germany? So now the Germans are telling us what we’re allowed to do and what we’re not allowed to do?'”. For the Germans, this is obviously extremely difficult. But, given the way the situation has developed, defending the State of Israel, for me, requires dissociating oneself from the current government. So we need to find a diplomatic-political way of making it clear that, yes, we are on the side of the Israeli people and the Jews of Israel, but that we see that this government is leading Israel to its doom.

If we wrote this text with Raphaël Glucksmann at that time, it’s because we could no longer stand the evasion of the Palestinian question. There came a point when we could no longer keep quiet.

Because, and this is the whole question now, what is being proposed to the Palestinians? I’m not saying Hamas, but the Palestinians. What are they being offered? Does Israel have any idea of a perspective for the Palestinians? I’m well aware that all this will take time. Without a process in which the Palestinians start to disassociate themselves from Hamas, we won’t get there. But we have to offer something to the Palestinians, even if it’s a minimal concession.

DT : The embryo was there. It was the Palestinian Authority.

DCB : Well, I’m in favor of recognizing the Palestinian Authority. To recognize, but not just any way. The French government or the European Union should reach an agreement with the Palestinian Authority, clearly stating the basis for this recognition. First and foremost, recognition of the State of Israel, which, as we wrote in the text with Raphaël Glucksamnn in Le Monde, must extend to school textbooks. Just as the State of Israel must exist, irremovable, so must an irremovable Palestinian state exist. Moreover, Abbas’s speech to the UN three or four years ago was not stupid. When he said: “I’m looking at a map of the Middle East, a state is missing”. He didn’t say: “There’s one too many”. This is the direction in which Europe must push, and the Palestinians must understand that their perspective can only be that of two states. This requires an agreement in which mutual recognition is signed.

DT : That’s a return to Oslo.

DCB :Yes, but three decades later… In the meantime, things have come to a head, with October 7. If we wrote this text with Raphaël Glucksmann at that time, it’s because we could no longer stand the evasion of the Palestinian question. Yet we waited, and justified Israel’s war in reaction to October 7: yes, Hamas had to be attacked, Israel had to do it. But there came a point when we could no longer keep quiet. The further the war progressed, the less we understood what the Israelis were trying to achieve, other than to keep Netanyahu in power. Without any solution for the Palestinians, the risk is that terrorism is being fuelled indefinitely.

DT : Of course, the current Israeli government is happy to propose nothing for the simple reason that it prefers that there be no Palestinian state.

DCB : You know the joke? God calls Trump, Putin and Netanyahu and says, “Look, you’re great states, but in two weeks the world is going to fall apart. Go and tell that to your people”. Trump makes a speech and says: “I met God, that’s great. He recognized that we’re the most important state on the planet. So that’s good news. But the bad news is that in 15 days, there’s nothing left”. Speaking from the Kremlin, Putin says: “I’ve got good news: we’ve met God and he’s recognized that Russia really is the state with the most important mission for the whole planet. But I have bad news: in 15 days, it’s all over”. And Netanyahu announces: “I have two pieces of good news. First, God has recognized that we are the chosen people. And secondly, there will be no Palestinian state”. (laughs)

C’est paradoxal : la plupart des gens se disent pour la solution à deux États, mais ne veulent en soutenir qu’un. Voilà le drame de la situation, il y a une injonction à choisir son camp.

JC : Can we go back to your interview with Glucksmann? In it, you essentially say: “We Jews were alone, no one supported us, no one was on our side. But that’s no reason to keep quiet now.

DCB : Yes, we found intolerable not only what Hamas had done, but also this lack of empathy. And we suffered for it. But just because we suffered doesn’t mean we can’t suffer from what’s happening in Gaza. One doesn’t prevent the other.

JC : But where do you think this lack of symmetry comes from?

DCB :That’s really the most difficult problem. We live in a world where you can only be on one side. So you’re either pro-Palestinian or pro-Israeli. And unfortunately, most people haven’t understood, apart from a minority in Israel who say it in an interesting way, that to be truly pro-Israeli, you also have to be pro-Palestinian. Otherwise it won’t work. It reminds me of a story. Aurélie Filippetti, who was with the Greens at the time, said “If we’re going to demonstrate for the Palestinians, I’ll demonstrate with two flags: a Palestinian flag and an Israeli flag”. She was expelled from the Greens for that. I supported her, and she was absolutely right. That’s the right position to take.

DT : So the Palestinians have to be pro-Israeli too.

DCB : Yes, and the Israelis have to be pro-Palestinian. Because the condition for the Palestinians to have a perspective is for the Israelis to have one. And vice-versa. But unfortunately, we live in a world where, when I say that, people look at me as if I were proposing infamy. It’s paradoxical: most people say they’re in favor of a two-state solution, but only want to support one. That’s the tragedy of the situation: there’s an injunction to choose sides.

JC : How do you explain that?

DCB : It’s the Manichaeism of politics in general: you’re either left or right.

DT : That’s true, but at the same time, in the big pro-Palestinian demonstrations, the slogan “from the river to the sea” isn’t the left/right alternative, but the demand for one that requires the erasure of the other.

DCB : And in the government agreement between Netanyahu and the far-right parties, it says: “From the sea to the river is Jewish”.

DT : That’s true.

DCB : That’s the problem. I remember talking to a settler spokesman in Hebron, when I went there with people from Breaking the Silence. The guy was John Wayne, with a Colt on his belt. After he shows us the synagogue and the Torah, I ask him what he thinks of the situation of the Palestinians. “I don’t care,” he replies. “But the State of Israel can’t go on like this,” I tell him. “Yes, because if you let us fall in Hebron, tomorrow Haifa will fall, Tel Aviv will fall, Jerusalem will fall. You won’t last.” I ask him, “What about the Palestinians?” He replies: “It’s simple. They offered us Madagascar, we offer them Madagascar”. And all you can do is look at the guy with big eyes…

DT : Well it’s clear that that came from a particularly radicalized faction.

DCB :They’re fascists, racists. They’re very strong and numerous in the West Bank, and what’s new with this government is that they’re in power.

DT : We thought, we hoped, that it would collapse fairly quickly, and it hasn’t… I’d like to come back to your joke about the end of the world. In it, God summons the United States and Russia, but not Europe. Your trajectory is that of a European militant. The post-68 period gave rise to a whole series of reconversions. Benny Lévy, for example, went in one direction – we know which. And you went in the direction of Europe. Can you tell us more about the role Europe has played in your political career?

DCB :My relationship with Europe stems from the fact that my parents left Germany in 1933. My father was a left-wing lawyer who was arrested after the Reichstag fire. So I was born in France to German parents. And I was stateless until the age of 13, because my parents didn’t register me at birth, unlike my brother who was born in 1936, because they hoped to go either to the United States or Palestine. They didn’t go. And after six months, if you haven’t been registered, it’s too late, you can’t be French. So I was stateless. My parents were stateless, before later regaining German nationality. So my parents were German, my brother was French. And I didn’t want to choose.

Then, upon my father’s advice, who had returned to Germany to work as a lawyer, I took German nationality to avoid having to do my military service. At the time, a German government decree stipulated that the children of persecuted people did not have to do military service if they didn’t want to. So I became German. But I wasn’t German. I was really a paper German and I was stateless because they wouldn’t give me French nationality. It’s from this story that my vision of the future emerged, according to which we have to go beyond this France/Germany alternative. That’s how I interpret my history.

DT : It was Europe – but on your mother’s side, it could have been Israel instead. The dilemma isn’t just Germany or France, it’s Europe/Israel too. And Israel is also a way of overcoming the problem of European nationalism.

DCB : For a long time, the Europe/Israel alternative wasn’t my problem, even though when I was 17 I went to Israel, to Kibbutz Hazorea. The problem was that I didn’t want to become an Israeli nationalist. I’m a stateless person. I have a friend who says, about the Jews who left Eastern Europe to come to Israel: “They left as Jews and arrived as Israelis”. Obviously, they are Jews, but they are first and foremost Israelis. They identify with a nation, that’s what they want. It’s not my place to criticize them, but it’s not my story and it’s not my will. Even if I now have French nationality, I’m still a stateless person. And I can’t be a nationalist of anything, neither Israeli nor French. Except in soccer, where I’m always for the French team, but that’s another matter (laughs).

For me, Europe is about overcoming nationalism. Israel, on the other hand, would force me to nationalize myself. I’m not nationalizable, and I don’t want to be.

DT : So, they became Israelis first and Jews second, and you, by remaining European, remained first Jewish and then European?

DCB :No, by being European, I was first of all nothing. Then I realized that I’m also Jewish. It’s not the most decisive thing, but it’s a constant. A constant that I ignored for a long time, or that I repressed.

DT : When did this come about?

DCB : It’s a very simple story. I’m married to a woman who’s a goy.

DT : It happens.

DCB :It happens (laughs). When I watch certain films, they make me cry. I always cry. One day I’m talking to my wife and I say, “ Israel isn’t my problem”. And she says, “Dany, you’re simplifying things. It’s not true”.

DT : What film was that, for example?

DCB :

All kinds of films, whether it was Schindler’s List, anything… Whenever there’s a Nazi. It could be Gatti’s L’Enclos… I mean, it’s every film there is on the subject, good and bad. And so that’s when, about ten years ago, I let myself go and tried to understand. I think that… I’m a diasporic Jew. I’m a diasporic Jew who never goes to synagogue, who never celebrates anything. And I’m not interested, really. The only thing that’s a bit funny is my son in Frankfurt, who, while obviously not Jewish, is totally integrated into the Jewish community. He’s not religious at all, but he’s involved with Maccabi Frankfurt. In fact, the Jewish community is trying, by attracting him to them, to perhaps one day attract me too…

Nevertheless, for me, Europe is about overcoming nationalism. Israel, on the other hand, would force me to nationalize myself. I’m not nationalizable, and I don’t want to be. I don’t criticize those who do, and that’s why I’m a-Zionist. I’m not saying: “It’s impossible”. I’m saying: “ It’s not my business ”. However, I’m ready to defend this state, on condition that the Israelis also defend the Palestinians.

JC : But do you still believe in a post-national Europe, after the developments we’ve seen in the East? We defend Ukraine as a nation-state… I’m familiar with the Habermasian discourse on Europe, which, like yours, tells a post-national story. But Europe does include nations! How do you analyze Europe’s crisis? The rise of nationalist populism seems to indicate that Europe hasn’t seen that most people don’t want to say to themselves: “We’re not nationalized”.

DCB : This is a very interesting historical moment. Your diagnosis is correct. But at the same time, never in the history of Europe have nations been so weak. What is France in the world? Nothing at all. Neither is Germany. And the same can be said of all European states. I mean, all the problems we face, whether it’s immigration, global warming, the economy, China, wars, protection from Russia, none of it can be dealt with at a national level.

Maybe Europe is impossible, because the hope of getting out of it nationally is still too strong. But the paradox is that today, the populist far right doesn’t believe in leaving Europe.

DT : How then do you explain the crisis of rising populism, when logically it should be an opportunity to move to the next level by giving more power to Europe? What’s going on, what mistake have we made?

DCB : There is a mistake, but before talking about the mistake, I’d like to point out that today’s Europe marks a break with three centuries of history. And great historical ruptures are always tragic. Germany is an example of the transition to the nation-state, but all transitions to the nation-state have been highly problematic and contradictory. Today, while we’re still steeped in the nation-state, we’re realizing that it’s slipping away from us. And so there’s a retrograde reaction, because we’re hoping to keep hold of it, to escape the consequences of this rupture. Why do some people hope that France will stop the “great replacement”? Because it would be so much simpler. So Europe’s mistake, or rather the difficulty it faces, is that it has not succeeded in proposing an imaginary world to grasp the complexity of this historical rupture. There have been many European imaginations, but always under the auspices of a nation. Germany thought of Europe, France thought of Europe… But a Europe as an egalitarian space, where no nation dominates, seems contradictory, almost unthinkable. How could this perspective be articulated? It follows that we come up against this difficulty in the form of a nationalist retreat, which seems so much simpler and more obvious.

JC : But at one point in Europe’s history, its pride was to declare “never again”. That seems to have completely passed, as if history wasn’t enough to found a political project.

DCB : Because there’s a selfishness on the part of people who think first of what’s happening today. So maybe Europe is impossible. Maybe today, national preference, the hope of getting out of the situation nationally, is still too strong. But the paradox is that today, the populist far right doesn’t believe in leaving Europe. They want to renationalize a little, but Marine Le Pen knows she can’t get out of the Euro or Europe. As for Meloni, she knows it’s impossible and that, given the problems, it would be catastrophic. The AfD is an exception for the moment, but the Euro has created something unsurpassable.

DT : What then is being defeated by Europe in its populist version?

DCB : I think that what Europe isn’t doing, what no state is doing, is to take immigration out of a purely security-based approach. We need a Ministry of Immigration or Integration. And we need an institution at city level, like the multicultural office we set up in Frankfurt, to deal with the problems that arise. And these are above all problems that have to do with how immigrants accept the country they arrive in, and vice versa, how the “natives” accept immigrants. I was very impressed by a school in Tel Aviv that I filmed, the Bialik-Rogozin school. It’s a school with over 1,000 children, all refugees. And the man who set up the school wanted the children and their parents to stay in Israel. But he always told me: “They have to know they’re in Israel. They’re not in Botswana, they’re not in France. They’re in Israel with all of Israel’s problems. So they sing the Hatikvah (the national anthem). We have to integrate them into Israel”. And it’s the same thing in Europe: you have to integrate immigrants in France or Germany, they have to confront the country where they settle.

Integrating means being aware of the society we defend, which is our own.

JC : But here, you’re integrating them into nations. How do you integrate them into Europe?

DCB : No, I integrate them at the level of towns and villages, not directly at the level of the nation. The important thing is that they experience a democratic framework. And it’s from this democratic framework that we can integrate them into Germany, and into German history. We can explain to them that they are coming to a country with such and such a history, and that this country’s perspective is the European Union. Tensions are due to an inequality of experience: they haven’t lived through it, because they come from somewhere else. And so, we have to explain and work with the families, to create situations that enable them to understand how we got here, for example on women’s rights or why Germany supports Israel. But we haven’t done that job very well.

JC : So, for you, integration comes through history.

DCB : It comes through history, but also through work and the social state. In the 1960s, integration was achieved through work. The vast majority of immigrants were salaried workers. But that’s not enough, because without the political and historical dimension, you create communitarianism. Parallelgesellschaft as we say in Germany, parallel societies that try to recreate the world they come from in their own environment, to recreate a little Turkey, a little Algeria…

DT : The problem, then, is that you can have people who are socially integrated, who earn a living, who lead a normal life, and who, politically, will say no. People who refuse to understand why their families are not integrated. People who refuse to understand why Germany has a special relationship with Israel, or why women’s rights should be respected.

DCB : Yes, that’s why I think we need to be clear about the conditions for entry, and the conditions for staying. It’s also at the level of managing residence and work permits that we can have a dialogue, that we can say to them “There you go, you’ve got a future here. But you know what Germany is like. And Germany has a special relationship, because of its history, with Israel. Don’t you like that? I don’t blame you. You can go somewhere else”. But then, it’s not just immigrants. There are already millions of Germans who are like that, who refuse to understand politically and historically. All East Germans earn a living, go to school, and they’re racist. Well, not all of them, but the 30% who vote AfD, that’s already a lot. So what do we do? We have to fight.

DT : But there’s no way of getting to them, whereas with the newcomers, there is.

DCB : Unfortunately, it’s true that we can’t send them back to Russia. I’d like to (laughs). But listen, today there are a third of Syrians in Germany who are integrated, who have understood, a third who hesitate and a third who don’t want to understand. So the future is open. I reverse Renan: “Democracy is a daily plebiscite”. Integration is a daily struggle. Because these immigrants are here, and the law, the right of asylum, all that, exists. So, whatever we do, we have to accept their integration. But integrating them means being aware of the society we defend, which is our own.

JC : And what about France? Because you said there’s a problem of antisemitism among Muslims. In Germany, it’s relatively easy to explain German history in relation to the Jews. But for France, there’s the whole problem of a colonial and post-colonial history that divides memory and complicates matters. How do you explain the problem of antisemitism to Muslims?

DCB : The problem is that in France, compared to Germany, there’s no such awareness or understanding of the Jewish desire to own a state. There’s no awareness of the need for the State of Israel to exist. That’s precisely why it’s harder to explain things in France than in Germany. But I think we now need to turn things around, and define the framework of France’s relationship with the State of Israel, i.e. to remember that the latter is a consequence of what happened in Europe, for which France is also somewhat responsible. Because in 1938, at the Evian Conference, no country wanted to take in German Jews. They all said: “We’ve already got too many”. That was Europe, refusing the Jews protection.

JC : So, basically, France isn’t well enough integrated into Europe, since it can’t explain this history?

DCB :That’s what’s generally lacking in Europe, responsibility for the Shoah, or the pogroms in the East. And that’s what you have to explain if you’re talking about antisemitism, you have to say: “We’re a country that failed in the fight against antisemitism, as Pétain testified, because he collaborated. And so, you’re in a country where there’s this historical mistake to make up for. Just as we have to make up for the massacres of colonialism, it’s the same thing”.

JC : But in order to integrate properly, the French would already have to understand that.

DCB : Yes, French society and the French state would already have to clarify their understanding of their own history, including collaboration and decolonization, and its implications for a new, shared definition of what French society should be.

JC : But the French left, at one point, had done this work. In ’68, when you were expelled from France, they all shouted “We’re all German Jews”. But today, the younger generation is shouting “Zionists out of our universities”. What’s happened?

DCB : Well, it’s true that some people are shouting that, but there are fewer than you’d think. When you see what happened at Sciences Po, it was 150 people, 150 idiots too many, but it wasn’t a large-scale movement. 68 was a real movement in all universities. That’s not the case today. I’m not saying it’s not serious. I’m just saying that you have to describe things as they are. What was great about “We are all German Jews” was that it was shouted out with an awareness of solidarity that transcended origins, communities and ethnic groups. It was a truly historic moment. But post-68 history has often been tragic. When you look at the Maoists, the proletarian left, it’s enough to make you feel completely shattered. Geismar was in jail, and Geismar/Arafat posters were brandished. If you look at the whole post-68 period, between the Maoists, the Trotskyists and other factions, the madness was widespread. Edwy Plenel wrote an article in the magazine Rouge describing the attack on Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games as an anti-imperialist intervention… And today, in the face of the crimes of Hamas, we find the same stupidity, the same anti-imperialist impulse as that of the Stalinists in the 50s. So today we’re joining a whole history of politics in France.

I think we need to attack BDS by denouncing its totalitarian basis, its desire to dictate to academics, writers and artists what they have or don’t have the right to think. It’s foolish to prevent Israeli universities from producing a genuine reflection on Israeli society.

JC : Okay, there are 150 people at Sciences Po, but at our institution, EHESS, the teachers’ assembly – the body that decides on the institution’s major political orientations – has just voted to boycott Israeli universities. How do you react to this?

DCB : Today, the stupidity of boycotting Israeli universities consists in targeting the places where the intelligence of Israel’s opposition to Netanyahu is concentrated. This is also the folly of BDS. I don’t know if BDS members are antisemitic. I don’t think Butler is. But they are as aberrant as the Left has been in its worst moments. Yet in the beginning, BDS was defended in the European Parliament, because the boycott concerned goods produced in the occupied territories. Given that the occupation is illegal, there was a justification. But then, when it’s extended to culture and universities, it’s an aberration, it becomes totalitarian. Charles Aznavour and Jane Birkin have sung in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. And they both expressed the wish to sing in Ramallah too. But they were refused, because they had sung in Israel. I think we need to tackle BDS by denouncing its totalitarian basis, its desire to dictate to academics, writers and artists what they have or don’t have the right to think. It’s foolish to prevent Israeli universities from producing a genuine reflection on Israeli society. Obtuse stupidity must be attacked. But I’m not surprised that an assembly of professors can vote for anything.

JC : Where is the limit of freedom of expression for you? Because obviously, you’re a democrat. But at the same time, you’ve been a fierce critic of Walser^[2], denying it the ability to say anything.

DCB : There are no limits to freedom of expression. I didn’t say that Walser should be banned, I said that he should be attacked. I’m not saying that Butler should be prevented from speaking in Germany, but that they should come under attack.

DT : So the Gayssot law was a mistake?

DCB : Yes. I’m opposed to the idea of parliaments judging history. I understand why people want the law on the Armenian genocide. I understand that it feels good, but it’s pointless. We have to get to grips with the problems. We need to organize contradictory debates, because freedom of speech is also freedom for stupidity to express itself.

DT : Of course. But is apology for terrorism nonsense, or something more serious? When people praise the October 7 massacres, is that freedom of expression?

DCB : If you can find a way of legally condemning this type of comment, I’d like to. But it’s very difficult, and we have to be careful. Because apology for terrorism and a certain completely aberrant interpretation of October 7 are not the same thing. Apology for Stalinism was an infamy. But it was a legally incondemnable infamy, and we have to be very careful not to lose all discernment. In any case, banning stupidity doesn’t prevent it from being said. So I don’t think it can be done by law: it has to be done by society. I’m sure there’s a fair definition of apology for terrorism. I don’t deny that. But of course, not every form of support for the Palestinian struggle is an apology for terrorism.

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Interview by Julia Christ and Danny Trom